Butt Out: An Analysis of the FDA\u27s Proposed Restrictions on Cigarette Advertising under the Commercial-Speech Doctrine by Helberg, Daniel
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
4-1-1996
Butt Out: An Analysis of the FDA's Proposed
Restrictions on Cigarette Advertising under the
Commercial-Speech Doctrine
Daniel Helberg
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel Helberg, Butt Out: An Analysis of the FDA's Proposed Restrictions on Cigarette Advertising under the Commercial-Speech Doctrine,
29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1219 (1996).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol29/iss3/15
BUIT OUT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE FDA'S
PROPOSED RESTRICTIONS ON CIGARETTE
ADVERTISING UNDER THE COMMERCIAL-
SPEECH DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1969 in response to the growing recognition of the dangers of
cigarette smoking, Congress passed the Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act.' In doing so Congress made a highly political choice
to attack the problem by limiting the marketing of cigarettes over the
broadcast media rather than directly regulating the product. The Act
made it unlawful to "advertise cigarettes ... on any medium of
electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Communications Commission.",
2
On its face the Smoking Act seemed to inflict a major blow on
cigarette manufacturers. However, the history of the Act reveals that
the restriction was in the best interests of the cigarette manufacturers,
and that cigarette consumption actually increased upon passage of the
Act.
Over the past two decades, the scientific community's under-
standing of the dangers of smoking has grown stronger. At the same
time cigarette manufacturers have shifted their advertising dollars into
other media or found ways to skirt the rules by advertising at
televised sporting events.4 Their presence is particularly striking in
1. Pub. L. No. 91-222,84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
1340 (1994)).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994).
3. See infra part III.B.
4. The Justice Department recently cracked down on one tobacco giant, bringing suit
against Philip Morris for illegally advertising on broadcast television through stadium signs.
The parties immediately settled under an agreement requiring the cigarette company to
move their signs to positions less conspicuous to television cameras. However, the
agreement excludes auto racing; its application is limited to football, basketball, and
baseball stadiums. A Philip Morris spokesperson suggested that auto racing sponsorship
was very different and that the ruling had no implications on motorsports. The Justice
Department, however, did not foreclose the possibility of action in that venue. Ira
Teinowitz & Jeff Jensen, Roadblock for Racing?, ADVERTISING AGE, June 12,1995, at 44,
44.
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the sport of auto racing in which cigarette companies sponsor racing
series, and sponsored teams dominate various racing circuits. When
a Roger Penske-owned race car leads a race, Marlboro's logo may
appear on national television for hours. Such promotion is cost-effec-
tive and targets a very loyal audience with an appealing image.5
The continuing shift in public and political opinion towards
cigarette smoking led President Clinton to instruct the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to draft regulations which would keep tobacco
away from teenagers. 6 The FDA responded by proposing regulations
restricting the sale and distribution of cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco products to protect children and adolescents.7 The FDA
proposal places substantial limitations on advertising and promotional
practices, including event sponsorship, to "decrease the amount of
positive imagery that makes [cigarette] products so appealing to
[children]."8 This will significantly reduce the ability of cigarette
companies to market their products, with a consequential impact on
industries dependent upon the sponsorship revenue. In particular, the
money-intensive auto racing industry faces a significant loss of
operating revenue.9
Following Clinton's announcement, the top five cigarette manu-
facturers immediately brought suit disputing the FDA's jurisdiction.10
However, the FDA released an extensive jurisdictional analysis along
with the proposed rules," concluding that "nicotine in cigarettes...
is a drug, and.., these products are drug delivery devices within the
meaning of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act."'2
Critics initially suggested that Clinton was using the FDA to force
a compromise. 3 Under current law if the regulatory body directly
regulates cigarettes, rather than their advertisement, it must either
declare nicotine safe and effective and approve it, or outlaw the
5. See infra part I.D.
6. Elizabeth Gleick, Out of the Mouths of Babes, TIME, Aug. 21, 1995, at 33, 33.
7. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 897)
(proposed Aug. 11, 1995).
8. Id at 41,314.
9. Jeanne Whalen, Cigarette Interest Flags in Racing, ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 6,
1993, at 28, 28.
10. Gleick, supra note 6, at 34.
11. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,454 (1995).
12. Id. at 41,455.
13. Philip J. Hilts, F.D.A. Head Says He is Seeking No Big Change in Cigarette Rules,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1994, at Al, A20.
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drug.'4 Despite the American Medical Association's expressed de-
sire for a smoke-free society by the year 2000,15 the government is
unlikely to go that far. Both Representative Henry Waxman, a
leading opponent of the cigarette industry, and FDA Commissioner
Dr. David A. Kessler have gone on record stating that their aim is not
a total ban on cigarettes. 6 The proposed compromise legislation
would allow the FDA to "regulate advertising, promotion, sales and
nicotine level-in exchange for keeping cigarettes on the market."'7
While this scenario unfolded, the 104th Congress introduced a
series of bills designed to curb other forms of advertisement of
tobacco products; 8 bring regulation of such products under the
control of the FDA; 9 and require the reduction and eventual elimi-
nation of nicotine in tobacco products.'°
The cigarette industry countered by lobbying for the introduction
of bills, in both the Senate and House, prohibiting the regulation of
tobacco-sponsored advertising "used by the National Association of
Stock Car Auto Racing [(NASCAR)] ... or any other professional
motor sports association."'" In addition the R.J.Reynolds Tobacco
Company, in direct response to the President's rhetoric and the FDA
proposals, ran a series of ads criticizing the proposal, including one
which directly addressed the sponsorship of auto racing.' The
tobacco company enlisted legendary stock car driver and Winston Cup
Champion Richard Petty' to write an open letter to the Presi-
14. Alan C. Miller, Will Foe Throw Tobacco Firms a Lifeboat?, L.A. TIMES, July 1,
1994, at A3.
15. Thomas E. Kottke, Smoke-Free 2000: A Step Closer, 274 JAMA 503 (1995).
16. Hilts, supra note 13, at Al; Miller, supra note 14, at A3.
17. Miller, supra note 14, at A3.
18. Tobacco Products Control Act of 1995, S. 1262,104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). This
bill would amend the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act to restrict advertis-
ing on billboards near elementary and secondary schools; print ads in publications with
more than 15% of its subscribers under the age of 18; and placement of cigarette products
packages or advertisements in motion pictures, videos, video game machines, or on or
within a family amusement center. Id. § 2.
19. Youth Smoking Prevention Act of 1995, H.R1 2414, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
20. Freedom From Nicotine Addiction Act of 1995, H.R. 1853, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
21. S. 1295, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1995); H.R. 2265, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
22. See Advertisement, R.J.Reynolds Tobacco Company, Together We Can Work It
Out, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1995, at C5 [hereinafter R.J.R. Advertisement].
23. R.J.Reynolds has sponsored the Winston Cup series since 1970. Chris Roush, Red
Necks, White Socks, and Blue-Chip Sponsors, Bus. WK., Aug. 15, 1994, at 74, 74. The
marketer currently sponsors the series, a race team, and contributes $3.5 million in prizes
to drivers. Teinowitz & Jensen, supra note 4, at 44.
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dent.O4 The cigarette company attempted to trade on public distrust
of bureaucracies, and attacked the President's administration with
what amounts to a veiled political threat. Petty wrote:
Look, the fact of the matter is nobody wants kids to
smoke. Not the President. Not the tobacco companies. Not
me. But preventing a company from putting its brand name
on NASCAR Winston Cup racing isn't going to make a bit
of difference. The way I see it, this Administration's just
looking to distract our attention from the things you and I
really care about. And anybody connected to tobacco is an
easy target.
I've been around for a long time now, and I've seen
plenty of Government regulation. But I never thought I'd
see the day when the Government told me I couldn't paint
somebody's name on the side of my car.
Despite this vigorous response, the cigarette industry faces a daunting
task under current commercial-speech doctrine.
This Comment reviews the case law leading to the original ban
on tobacco broadcast ads. It then analyzes the constitutionality of the
proposed FDA advertising and sponsorship regulations in light of
cases comprising the modem conception of commercial speech within
the First Amendment. Along the way it articulates an updated
formulation of the Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Comm. test and discusses the many difficulties in its applica-
tion. Ultimately the analysis suggests that cigarette advertisers will
find their strongest argument in Central Hudson's requirement that
restrictions on commercial speech be no more extensive than
necessary.
There is no doubt regarding the dangers of smoking and the
power of the media to influence buying behavior. However, the
decision to reduce cigarette smoking through advertising restrictions
sacrifices First Amendment principles, personal autonomy, and the
health of existing smokers in the name of political expediency.
In many ways Richard Petty is right. Preventing a company from
putting its brand name on NASCAR Winston Cup racing is not the
best way to discourage smoking. The government should regulate the
nicotine content of cigarettes. By gradually removing the addictive
24. See R.J.R. Advertisement, supra note 22, at C5.
25. Id.
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substance, demand for tobacco products will more accurately reflect
public will in light of legal advertising, and undoubtedly lead to a
more significant reduction in overall smoking than any ban on
promotion.
II. THE TOBACCO PROBLEM, PROPOSED RESTRICTIONS AND
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON SPORTING EVENTS
A. The Tobacco Problem
The dangers of cigarette smoking are very real and substantial
in both individual and societal terms. The statistics are sobering. An
estimated fifty million Americans smoke cigarettes26 and another six
million use smokeless tobacco products.2 7 To keep up with this
demand the United States tobacco industry produces more than 1.6
million cigarettes each day.?
Tobacco remains the largest preventable cause of illness and
premature death.z9 Each year more than 400,000 Americans die
from smoking-related illnesses.30 At this rate the cigarette compa-
nies would soon kill their entire market were it not for the fact that
each day another 3000 young people become regular smokers.
31
Approximately three million American adolescents currently smoke,
a figure of particular significance in light of data suggesting that
"anyone who does not begin smoking in childhood or adolescence is
unlikely to ever begin.,
32
26. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE:
POPULATION ESTIMATES 1993, Publication No. 94-3017 (1994) at 89,95; Cigarette Smoking
Among Adults-United States, 1993,43 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 925,925-
30 (1994).
27. Use of Smokeless Tobacco Among Adults-United States, 1991,42 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 263, 263 (1993).
28. Mark Clayton, Would a Total Ad Ban Be Hazardous to Tobacco Industry's
Health?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 12, 1985, (Business) at 25.
29. Cigarette Smoking-Attributable Mortality and Years of Potential Life-United
States, 1990, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 645, 645 (1993).
30. Id. By comparison, 250,000 Americans die each year from AIDS, alcohol,
murders, car accidents, suicides, illegal drugs, and fires combined. INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, COMMITTEE ON PREVENTING NICOTINE ADDICITION IN CHILDREN AND
YOUTHS, GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE: PREVENTING NICOTINE ADDICTION IN
CHILDREN AND YOUTHS 4 (Barbara S. Lynch & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 1994) [hereinafter
TOBACCO FREE].
31. TOBACCO FREE, supra note 30, at 8.
32. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1995) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN-SERVS.,
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B. The Power of the Media
The proposed FDA and Congressional legislation is predicated
on the conclusion that "easy access to tobacco products, advertising
and promotional activities can influence a young person's decision to
smoke or use smokeless tobacco products."33 Despite the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act,34 which proscribed the use of
broadcast advertising, tobacco products remain "among the most
heavily advertised products in the United States."35 To maintain and
replace customers, the tobacco industry spends an estimated $6 billion
to advertise and promote their product?
6
The tobacco industry continues to assert that advertising does not
create smokers but instead cultivates brand loyalty. 7  Its
spokespeople suggest that a ban on advertising, "'would just reduce
the [advertising] cost to the companies.' ,3 8 However, critics of such
ads conclude that they "convey to young people that tobacco use is
desirable, socially acceptable, safe, healthy, and prevalent in soci-
ety."39  While some of these conclusions are open to debate,4"
significant evidence attests to the media's power to build brand
PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL 5, 58, 65-67 (1994)).
33. Id. at 41,315.
34. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 89 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1335
(1994)).
35. 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,315 (citing the U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL 160 (1994)).
36. Federal Trade Commission, Report to Congress for 1993 Pursuant to the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 4 tbl. 3, 18 tbl. 3D (1995); see also Henry A.
Waxman, Tobacco and Our Kids, KEEPING IN TOUCH (Henry A. Waxman, Wash. D.C.)
Nov. 1995, at 4.
37. Clayton, supra note 28, (Business) at 25 (citing Anne Browder, Assistant to the
President of the Tobacco Institute). Studies show cigarettes have the highest brand loyalty
among consumers of any consumer product. Ronald Alsop, Brand Loyalty is Rarely Blind
Loyalty, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 1989, at B1.
38. Clayton, supra note 28, (Business) at 25 (citing Anne Browder, Assistant to the
President of the Tobacco Institute).
39. 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,315.
40. See Erica Swecker, Note, Joe Cameb Will "Old Joe" Survive?, 36 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1519, 1522-25 (1995) (discussing the existing studies on the causal link between
cigarette ads and smoking among children).
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awareness among children,4' thereby ensuring brand loyalty if the
children do start smoking.
C. Proposed FDA Restrictions
The FDA proposal will effectively close a wide range of
loopholes left open by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969. However, it offers little relief to those smokers already hooked
on nicotine. Rather than directly address the general problem by
reducing nicotine levels, the FDA limits its focus to the laudable goal
of "preventing future generations from developing an addiction to
nicotine-containing tobacco products."'42 Accordingly, the proposal
proscribes the sale, distribution, and advertisement of cigarette
products to minors.
Under subpart B of proposed title 21, section 897, the FDA
directly targets teen smoking by "restrict[ing] the sale of cigarettes
and smokeless tobacco products to individuals age 18 and older";43
"eliminat[ing] 'impersonal' methods of sale that do not readily allow
age verification, such as mail orders, self-service displays, and vending
machines"; prohibiting the distribution of free samples and sale of
single cigarettes and "kiddie" packs;45 restricting redemption of
coupons to face-to-face transactions with individuals eighteen and
older;' and finally, by "prohibit[ing] manufacturers from using a
trade name or brand name of a nontobacco product for a cigarette or
smokeless tobacco product."'47 The latter provision will prevent a
manufacturer from transferring the image, good will, and appeal of a
popular nontobacco product to a tobacco product.'
While this Comment will not analyze the sales and distribution
restrictions, these provisions stand in sharp contrast to the advertising
provisions, offering direct solutions to keep cigarettes out of the hands
of minors without impinging on constitutional rights.
41. See Paul M. Ficher et al., Brand Logo Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years:
Mickey Mouse and Old Joe the Camel, 266 JAMA 3145 (1991).
42. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1995).
43. Idl at 41,315, 41,322-23, 41,373-74 (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.14).
44. Id. at 41,315, 41,324-26, 41,373 (proposed 21 C.F.R. §§ 897.12(a), 897.14(b)).
45. Id. at 41,324, 41,374 (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.16(b)). "Kiddie" packs contain
fewer cigarettes, and are both more affordable and easier to conceal by minors, than full-
size packs. Id.
46. Id. at 41,315, 41,325-26, 41,373-74 (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.14(a)).
47. Id. at 41,315, 41,324, 41,374 (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.16).
48. Id at 41,315.
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Subpart C of the FDA proposal adds an education program,
putting more information in front of potential and current smokers.
The section requires "each manufacturer to establish and maintain a
national public education program"49 to counteract "the effects of
the pervasive and positive imagery that... foster[s] a youth market
for tobacco products."5 Each manufacturer would be required to
contribute an amount in proportion to its share of the national total
of advertising and promotional expenditures.5 The contributions
will total $150 million each year, the major portion of which would be
spent on television.5" Here again, this proposal raises no constitu-
tional issues; instead, the FDA seeks to maximize the power of the
media to shape public thought without restricting opposing points of
view regarding a legal product.
By contrast, subpart D proscribes labeling and advertising
practices, 3 directly implicating First Amendment rights. Under pro-
posed section 897.32, the FDA would restrict print advertising that
primarily reaches minors to black-and-white, text-only formats.54
This provision reflects the conclusion that "children and adolescents
are very receptive to images and cartoons and less attentive to
texts."'5 This conclusion also informs the proposed prohibition on
outdoor advertising on billboards outside of buildings within 1,000
feet of any playground, elementary school, or secondary school.
56
The proposal would also require that cigarette advertising contain
a statement of the product's established name; intended use; and a
brief statement regarding relevant warnings, precautions, side effects,
and contraindictions.57 In addition, there would be a complete
prohibition on branded, nontobacco items used by the manufacturers
as an "inducement to purchase cigarettes or generate purchases
49. Id at 41,326, 41,373 (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.29).
50. 1d at 41,326.
51. Id at 41,328, 41,374 (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.29(b)).
52. Id at'41,328.
53. I& at 41,334-40, 41,374.
54. Id at 41,335-36, 41,374. "[T]he proposed regulations would require that adver-
tising in any publication with a youth readership of more than 15 percent... or more than
2 million children and adolescents.., be limited to a text-only format in black and white."
Id. at 41,328.
55. Id. at 41,315, 41,335. By contrast, the "FDA believes that advertising in
publications that are read primarily by adults should be allowed to use imagery and color
because the effect of such advertising on young people would be nominal." Id. at 41,335.
56. Idt at 41,334, 41,374 (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(b)).
57. Id at 41,374 (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.32(b)).
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through the use of proof-of-purchase coupons.""8 Currently, smok-
ers, or those claiming to be smokers, can pick up a range of clothing
including free t-shirts and caps, and paper promotional products such
as calendars and pin-ups.5 9  Such promotions are particularly
effective with young people who carry these walking billboards into
schools and other locations where such advertising is usually prohibit-
ed.°
Finally, proposed section 897.34(c) severely restricts the sponsor-
ship of athletic, musical, or artistic events.6' This restriction applies
to both the overall sponsorship of the events and the individual
entries and teams, and will have a significant effect on sports such as
auto racing.62
The proposal limits event sponsorship to the name of the tobacco
company with a total prohibition on the use of any "brand name...
logo, symbols, motto, selling message, or any other indicia of product
identification similar or identical to those used for any brand of
cigarettes or smokeless tobacco products."'63 The proposal prevents
manufacturers from circumventing this rule by incorporating each
brand separately, through restriction of sponsorship to registered
corporate names in existence prior to January 1, 1995.' Sponsorship
of individual entries and teams is also limited to the name of the
tobacco company and must appear in a text-only, black-and-white
format.a
These limitations will effectively destroy the usefulness of event
sponsorships, since a good portion of their value derives from the
exploitation of the logo and color scheme of the products. To its
credit, however, the proposal effectively allows modest recognition for
those corporations sponsoring events based on philanthropic
motives.
66
58. Id. at 41,336, 41,374-75 (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.34(a), (b)).
59. Id at 41,336. This author received a range of promotional items as part of a
Marlboro racing promotion including a t-shirt and a wall calendar. More expensive
merchandise is available in exchange for symbols detached from packs of cigarettes. All
of this merchandise, of course, bears the Marlboro name. The registration form simply
requests a written verification of age.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 41,336, 41,375 (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.34(c)).
62. Id at 41,336-37.
63. Id. at 41,336, 41,375 (proposed 21 C.F.R § 897.34(c)).
64. Id (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.34(c)).
65. Id. (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.34(c)).
66. Id at 41,375 (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.34(c)).
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The FDA's proposal offers a wide-range of provisions which will
undoubtedly affect the sale of cigarettes to minors. However, those
provisions proscribing advertising represent a serious imposition on
freedom of speech and are predicated solely on the content of such
speech. In addition, the proposal only indirectly addresses other
significant socialization factors such as peer pressure and the highly
correlated effect of parental smoking on their children's choice to
begin smoking.67 While advertising surely serves to legitimize
smoking and build brand recognition, it is undoubtedly true that
direct peer and parental behavior is a much more salient factor in the
decision to smoke.
More importantly, the proposal fails to address the most
significant factor ensuring the continued use of the product-the
addictive quality of nicotine. Thus, the proposal acts as a gatekeeper
discouraging children from entering into the addiction but offdrs no
help to those trapped inside its walls.
D. Potential Impact on the Auto Racing Industry
The motorsport industry was founded on its marketing value.
Early automobile manufacturers invested in auto racing to demon-
strate the quality of their products.' Nonetheless, the sport re-
mained small until the late 1960s and early 1970s when "[t]elevision
coverage brought the excitement and danger of competition into
people's homes,"'69 and package product advertisers discovered the
value of painting their logos on car doors.70  Sponsorship had a
profound impact on auto racing; the exploding financial resources
enabled racing to develop into a high-tech, high-profile sport.7
Today an estimated 440 million television viewers watch Formula
1 racing internationally.72 In America the sponsor of a NASCAR
Winston Cup stock car receives more than thirty hours of television
coverage over the course of the series for the cost of one thirty-
67. Mark Fuerst, Passing the Torch, AM. HEALTH, June 1992, at 9, 9.
68. Bob Eastoe, Still in with a Sporting Chance, ACCr., Nov. 1994, at 34, 34.
69. Id. at 35.
70. In 1971 R.J.Reynolds began its association with NASCAR creating the Winston
Cup Championship, ushering in the modem and profitable era of stock car racing.
Winston also sponsors the National Hot Rod Association's Winston Drag Racing Series
and the NASCAR Winston West Series. Whalen, supra note 9, at 28.
71. RAINER W. SCHLEGELMILCH & HARTMUT LEHBRINK, PORTRAITS OF THE 60S
FORMULA 1 6 (1994).
72. Eastoe, supra note 68, at 34.
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second spot broadcast during the Super Bowl,73 making sponsorship
of auto racing particularly cost effective to advertisers. Furthermore,
research suggests that such advertising targets a particularly loyal fan
base.74 Despite the NASCAR's "red neck" image, studies suggest
that stock car fans have considerable disposable income and are more
likely to buy products from a NASCAR sponsor than from a
competitor that is not.75
The FDA restrictions on cigarette advertising will eliminate an
estimated $60 million in sponsorships,76 a significant source of reve-
nue for the sport. While other packaged goods will undoubtedly fill
the void,77 their contributions may not match those of cigarette
companies. Prohibited from directly advertising over the airwaves,
the cigarette industry finds a premium in such sponsorship. For
producers of nonrestricted products, the sponsorship of a sporting
event or entry is just one more venue to highlight a trademark on
television. By contrast, it is the only way that tobacco brands may
appear on television, amplifying the value of the powerful medium.
Deprived of the full value of sponsorship, cigarette manufacturers
will undoubtedly pull out of auto racing rather than limit sponsorship
to the name of the corporate parent.' As the Chairman and CEO
of R.J.Reynolds once noted, "we are in the business of selling
cigarettes, not the racing business."79  Proscription of cigarette
sponsorship will therefore have a significant short-term impact on the
financial structure of auto racing.
73. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,337 (1995) (citing lEG INC., lEG'S COMPLETE GUIDE TO
SPONSORSHIP: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT SPORTS, ARTS, EVENTS,
ENTERTAINMENT, AND CAUSE MARKETING 5 (Chicago, Ill., 1995)). By one account,
Philip Morris and R.J.Reynolds received nearly $40 million in "free" time on television
through sponsorships. Teinowitz & Jensen, supra note 4, at 44.
74. Alsop, supra note 37, at B1, B10.
75. Roush, supra note 23, at 74.
76. Whalen, supra note 9, at 28.
77. Over the last two years McDonald's Corp., Hershey Foods Corp., and the Kellogg
Co. entered racing, sponsoring cars in the NASCAR stock car series. ld.
78. However, the cigarette companies, which have diversified into other packaged
goods, may continue their investment through sponsorship in the name of these
unrestricted goods. David Phillips, Where There's Smoke: Will Congress Strip Racing of
Its Tobacco and Beer Sponsorship Dollars?, AUTOWEEK, Jan. 14, 1991, at 49, 52.
79. S. CHAPMAN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF CONSUMERS, THE DYING
TRADE, THE HAGUE, NETH. 53 (Sept. 1985).
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III. JUDICIAL HISTORY OF CIGARETTE ADVERTISING
RESTRICTIONS
A. Banzhaf v. FCC and the FCC's Fairness Doctrine Ruling
Banzhaf v. FCC"° heralded judicial approval of state restrictions
on cigarette advertising. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia affirmed "a ruling of the Federal Communications Com-
mission requiring radio and television stations which carry cigarette
advertising to devote a significant amount of broadcast time to
presenting the case against cigarette smoking."81 While the case did
not directly endorse restrictions on advertising, it set the stage for
subsequent legislation and litigation.
In December 1966, John E Banzhaf set the entire controversy in
motion when he wrote to WCBS-TV requesting free airtime "in which
anti-smokers might respond to the pro-smoking views he said were
implicit in the cigarette commercials it broadcast."' Banzhaf
suggested that through the "'portrayals of youthful or virile-looking
or sophisticated persons enjoying cigarettes in interesting and exciting
situations' [cigarette ads] raised one side of a 'controversial issue of
public importance.' "" As a'result, he concluded that "under the
FCC's fairness doctrine, WCBS was under obligation to... [air] 'con-
trasting viewpoints."'" The station replied that it had already
broadcast a number of news and information programs regarding the
smoking controversy and "doubted ... that 'the fairness doctrine
80. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom., 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
81. Id. at 1085.
82. Id. at 1086.
83. Id. (quoting Letter of John F. Banzhaf, Ill to Television Station WCBS-TV (Dec.
1, 1966)).
84. Id. The FCC articulated the Fairness Doctrine in 1949 in response to a Supreme
Court mandate that the FCC, in determining who could broadcast over the radio, must
consider the "'public interest, convenience, or necessity.'" Roland F. L. Hall, The
Fairness Doctrine and the First Amendment: Phoenix Rising, 45 MERCER L. REV. 705,709
(1994) (citing National Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943)).
The FCC determined that the public interest required "'ample play for the free and fair
competition of opposing views'" on all issues of importance to the public. Id. (citing Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,377 (1969)). The fairness doctrine, as applied
by the FCC, imposes a duty on broadcasters to "'devote a reasonable percentage of time
to the coverage of controversial issues of public importance,' and 'to afford a reasonable
opportunity for the presentation of contrasting points of view.'" Id. at 710 (citing DANIEL
L. BRENNER ET AL., CABLE TELEVISION AND OTHER NON-BROADCAST VIDEO (1992)).
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[could] properly be applied to commercial announcements solely and
clearly aimed at selling products and services.' 
8 5
Banzhaf subsequently forwarded the correspondence to the FCC
claiming that the station was violating the fairness doctrine.86 The
FCC agreed with Banzhaf, concluding that because cigarette commer-
cials "'present the point of view that smoking is "socially acceptable
and desirable, manly, and a necessary part of a rich full life,"' the
fairness doctrine was implicated.' The Commission was careful to
limit its holding to cigarettes because of the particular dangers
smoking poses to public health.88 While the Commission refused to
mandate equal time for the antismoking position, it required
television stations carrying cigarette ads to provide "'a significant
amount of time for the other viewpoint.' ..9  When pressed with
petitions to reconsider their decision, the Commission affirmed its rul-
ing in a Memorandum Opinion and Order90 and parties from both
sides of the smoking issue appealed.
In its review the circuit court in Banzhaf v. FCC9 examined
both the FCC's jurisdiction as well as the validity of the ruling under
the First Amendment. The court began its analysis by confronting the
assertion that "the Commission's action [was] precluded by the Fed-
eral Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965."'92 The
Labeling Act required cigarette manufacturers to print the warning
"Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health" on
each pack.93 At that time, a similar warning was not required on
cigarette advertisements.94 The court concluded that "[s]ince the
Commission's ruling does not require the inclusion of any 'statement
... in the advertising of any cigarettes,' but rather directs stations...
85. Banzhaf, 405 F.2d at 1061 (quoting Letter from Clark S. George, Vice-President
and General Manager, WCBS-TV to John F. Banzhaf, III (Dec. 30, 1966)).
86. Id
87. Id. (citing Television Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381, 381 (1967)).
88. Id (citing Television Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d at 381-82).
89. Id. at 1087 (citing Television Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d at 382).
90. Id. (citing Television Station WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967)).
91. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
92. Id. at 1087 (citing 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341
(1994)).
93. Id. at 1087-88 (citing Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1331-1339 (Supp. 1966)).
94. "No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the advertising
of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of
this chapter." 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (Supp. III 1964).
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to present 'the other side' [of the smoking issue],.., it does not vio-
late the letter of the Act."95
This conclusion required a narrow reading of the Act and a
determination that it was "passed in response to a pending Federal
Trade Commission rule which would have required warnings both on
packages and in all advertising." 96 By excluding a labeling require-
ment from advertisements, Congress balanced the government's
interest in informing the public of the dangers to health and the
interests of protecting commerce and the national economy.97 The
court was careful, to note that they did "not assume that Congress
wished to protect the economy at the expense of life and health, [but
that] it clearly did wish to protect it to the maximum extent compati-
ble with intelligent individual decisions on the health issue."9'
The court then turned to the issue of whether the Commission
had the authority to make the public interest ruling under the public
interest standard of the Communications Act.99 In its fair access
ruling, the Commission suggested that the presentation of commer-
cials "'urging the consumption of a product whose normal use has
been found ... to represent a serious potential hazard to public
health"' , was inconsistent with broadcast licensees' "'obligation to
operate in the public interest.""'0  Deferring this issue to the judg-
ment of Congress, the Commission nonetheless concluded that
licensees "'who present ... such commercials [must] devote a sig-
nificant amount of time to informing his listeners of the other side of
the matter. ... [T]he public interest means nothing if it does not
include such a responsibility.' 51102
While the Communications Act of 1934" merely authorized
the FCC to grant and renew broadcast licenses according to the
95. Banzhaf, 405 F.2d at 1088.
96. Id. at 1089 (citing 29 Fed. Reg. 8325 (1964)).
97. ld. at 1090. During hearings before the House Commerce Committee, a tobacco
industry spokesperson went so far as to suggest that "'[t]he right to advertise ... is
virtually destroyed if a manufacturer is required in every advertisement to disparage the
product."' Id. at 1091 n.28 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 2248, H.R. 3014, H.R. 4007, H.R.
7051, H.R. 4244 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 284 (1964)).
98. Id. at 1090 n.25.
99. Id. at 1091.
100. IL at 1092-93 (citing Television Station WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 949 (1967)).
101. Id. at 1093 (citing Television Station WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d at 949).
102. la, (citing Television Station WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d at 949).
103. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
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dictates of the public interest, convenience, or necessity,' °4 the
Supreme Court in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States 5 de-
termined that this language gave the Commission authority over
broadcast content."° Clearly such a determination has broad-
reaching implications on the FCC's power to censor programming by
denying, or threatening to deny, license renewals. Such an interpreta-
tion seems dubious at best given the express terms of the Communica-
tions Act which provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall be under-
stood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship
... and no regulation ... shall be promulgated ... which shall
interfere with the right of free speech.""lW
The circuit court downplayed the danger of such a position sug-
gesting that "[i]f agency power to designate programming 'not in the
public interest' is a slippery slope, the Commission and the courts
started down it too long ago to go back to the top now unless
Congress or the Constitution sends them."'"
The court went on to say that "[i]n practice, the Commission
rarely denies licenses for breaches of these duties"'"° and the
Commission's practice of focusing on a licensee's overall performance
and good faith rather than specific errors "probably minimizes the
dangers of censorship or pervasive supervision.""'  Ultimately, the
court suggested that "public interest rulings relating to specific
program content [do not] invariably amount to 'censorship' within the
meaning of the Act.""'
The court, however, did not seem completely convinced of this
conclusion and further justified the Commission's actions against a
First Amendment challenge. Recognizing that the First Amendment
"is unmistakably hostile to governmental controls over content of the
press,"" 2 the court first attempted to find support in the distinctions
between newspapers and the broadcasting media. Chief Judge Baze-
Ion suggested that communication through newspapers requires the af-
firmative act of reading, while the broadcast media is "omnipresent"
104. Id § 307(a), (d).
105. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
106. Id. at 217.
107. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1988).
108. Banzhaf, 405 F.2d at 1094.
109. Id. at 1095.
110. I&
111. Id. at 1096.
112. Id at 1100.
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and can only be avoided by leaving the room or changing chan-
nels."3  Without suggesting why this distinction should alter the
First Amendment analysis, Bazelon turned to the constitutionality of
the cigarette ruling itself and concluded that the "ruling does not
abridge the First Amendment freedoms of speech or press.""1
4
Bazelon articulated five considerations contributing to this con-
clusion. First, the cigarette ruling did not ban any speech but rather
only had a potentially chilling effect." Second, case law up to that
point suggested that product advertising "barely qualifie[d] as
constitutionally protected 'speech.'""6 Commercial speech did not
implicate an interest which the First Amendment sought to protect
such as the political process, the exchange of ideas or information, or
self-expression." 7 While the court accepted the contention that
"cigarette advertising implicitly states a position on a matter of public
controversy,""' it concluded that the advertisements did not present
information contributing to the public debate on smoking.' Clear-
ly, this position is dubious in the context of fair access and Banzhaf's
original contention that the advertisements raised one side of a
controversial issue. Ultimately the court ignored this inconsistency
and suggested that "even if cigarette commercials are protected
speech, we think they are, at best, a negligible 'part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of... slight social value as a step to truth."' 20
The third consideration focused on the economic incentives as a
countervailing force against any chilling effect. The court suggested
that "the cigarette manufacturers' interest in selling their product
guarantees a continued resourceful effort to reach the public." ' As
the next section of this Comment explains, the impact of this case
would ultimately prove this consideration wrong."2 This would also
hold true of both the fourth consideration, which suggested that the
Commission's ruling would support the "primary First Amendment
113. Id
114. Id at 1101.
115. Id
116. Id The court cited a number of Supreme Court cases indicating that commercial
speech was less rigorously protected than other forms of speech. Id at 1101 n.81.
117. Id at 1101-02.
118. Id at 1102.
119. Id
120. Id (alteration in original) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942)).
121. Id
122. See infra part III.B.
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policy ... to foster the widest possible debate and dissemination of
information on matters of public importance,"" and the related
fifth consideration that the ruling would provide rather than repress
information. 2 Chief Judge Bazelon was confident that where
one party to a debate has a financial clout and a compelling
economic interest in the presentation of one side unmatched
by its opponent, and where the public stake in the argument
is no less than life itself-we think the purpose of rugged
debate is served ... by an attempt to redress the bal-
ance.
125
However, Bazelon also prophetically suggested that "[i]f the
fairness doctrine cannot withstand First Amendment scrutiny, the
reason is that to insure a balanced presentation of controversial issues
may be to insure no presentation, or no vigorous presentation, at
all."' Within four years Congress banned all broadcast advertise-
ments at the behest of the cigarette manufacturers as a direct result
of this case.
B. Impact of Banzhaf
Judge Skelly Wright suggested, in his dissent in Capital Broad-
casting Co. v. Mitchell,27 that "[t]he history of cigarette advertising
since Banzhaf has been a sad tale of well meaning but misguided
paternalism."'" Following the Banzhaf decision "the broadcast
media were flooded with exceedingly effective antismoking commer-
cials. For the first time in years, the statistics began to show a
sustained trend toward lesser cigarette consumption."'29  The
decision in Banzhaf put the "industry in a delicate, paradoxical posi-
tion.... [I]ndividual tobacco companies could not stop advertising
for fear of losing their competitive position; yet for every dollar they
spent to advance their product, they forced the airing of more anti-
smoking advertisements and hence lost more customers."" The
123. Banzhaf, 405 F.2d at 1102.
124. Id. at 1103.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1102-03.
127. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), affd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1977).
128. Id. at 587 (Wright, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Wright, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, TOBACCO
SITUATION 5 (Sept. 1971); Hearing on H.R. 6543 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1969)).
130. Id. at 588 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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FCC's fair access requirement mandated the broadcast of one
antismoking message for every three or four cigarette ads, amounting
"to approximately $75 million (in 1970 dollars) in commercial air time
for antismoking messages annually.', 131 Thus, advertising on elec-
tronic media became a losing proposition for cigarette companies.
At that time the Consumer Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Commerce was in the process of considering new
cigarette legislation to replace the expiring statute governing the
health warnings in cigarette ads.32 "The context in which this deci-
sion had to be made shifted dramatically when a representative of the
cigarette industry suggested that the Subcommittee draft legislation
permitting the companies to remove their advertisements from the
air."' 33 The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969134 ulti-
mately saved the industry hundreds of millions of dollars in broadcast
media time,35 "relieved political pressure for FTC action, and re-
moved most antismoking messages from the air.', 136 In addition, the
"industry's 'altruism' [provided] a delay in pending FTC action against
cigarette advertising and a prohibition against stricter state regulation
of cigarette advertising."'37 For the public, however, the legislation
cut off the important flow of information regarding the dangers of
smoking.
131. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,327 (1995).
132. Capital Broadcasting Co., 333 F. Supp. at 588 (Wright, J., dissenting).
133. Id. (citing Hearing on H.R. 6543 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1969)). "The cigarette companies
requested an antitrust exemption so they could reach an agreement among themselves not
to advertise on the electronic media without fear of prosecution for restraint of trade."
Id. at 588 n.10.
134. Pub. L. No. 91-222,84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
1341 (1994)).
135. See S. REP. No. 566, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969). Interestingly, Congress did not
limit the preclusion to broadcast media but rather to "any medium of electronic
communication." 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994). This broad description proved prescient given
the array of narrow-cast electronic media such as CD-ROMs and on-line systems which
might have otherwise escaped a statute limited to broadcast media.
136. Capital Broadcasting Co., 333 F. Supp. at 588 (citing Hearing on H.R. 6543 Before
the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 160-
62, 172).
137. Id. at 588-89 (Wright, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1334(b), 1336 (Supp. V 1969)).
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C. Judicial Challenge To the Smoking Act: Capital
Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell
Given the cigarette manufacturers' complicity in the legislation
banning broadcast advertising, the dearth of First Amendment
challenges to the law is not surprising. In fact, the only significant
challenge to the Act was brought by broadcasters, who lost adver-
tising revenue following the enactment of the Act, rather than
cigarette manufacturers. Petitioners in Capital Broadcasting Co. v.
Mitchell"' were six broadcast corporations and the National Associ-
ation of Broadcasters (NAB).'39 The petitioners sought to enjoin
the enforcement of the Act and to have the Act declared violative of
both the First and Fifth Amendments."4
While the court noted that "product advertising is less vigorously
protected than other forms of speech"'' and that "[t]he unique
characteristics of electronic communication make it especially subject
to regulation in the public interest,"'42 the court's decision was not
based on this substantive issue. Rather, it concluded that the Act had
"no substantial effect on the exercise of [the radio broadcasters'] First
Amendment rights."'4 3 The court focused on the fact that the Act
did not prohibit broadcasters from disseminating information about
cigarettes, but only prevented them from collecting revenues from
others whose rights may have been denied."4
Though the conclusion was not stated in terms of standing, this
view runs counter to precedent on third-party standing and relies on
a slippery distinction between advertisers' and broadcasters' expres-
sion.'" This distinction is only strong if the broadcasters were
138. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971). Interestingly, the District of Columbia District
Court requested that John Banzhaf write a brief amicus curiae in his capacity as a
professor. I& at 583.
139. Ik
140. Id. The court held that the Act did not conflict with the Fifth Amendment, finding
a reasonable basis for the government to classify media into two classifications; one
prohibited from carrying cigarette advertisements and the other not. Id. at 585. The court
concluded that the persuasive power of broadcasting-particularly its influence on young
people-as compared to print advertising constituted a sufficiently reasonable basis. l
at 585-86.
141. Id. at 584.
142. I&
143. Id.
144. 1d.
145. Arguably the broadcasters' claim is sufficient even under the restrictive standard
articulated in the case of Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). The Supreme Court held that
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required to run all advertisements. Instead, the broadcasters make a
choice, albeit primarily an economic choice, in accepting the advertise-
ments; and thus, the ideology expressed within the advertisements is,
by limited extension, their own. Additionally, as the dissent pointed
out, the court misperceived the nature of the issue: "'It is the right
of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which
is paramount.""6
In dicta the court offered a cursory discussion on the limited pro-
tection due commercial speech. In announcing an acceptance of
Banzhaf, the court paradoxically suggested that while cigarette adver-
tising is covered by the fairness doctrine by virtue of public impor-
tance, this "political nature" is insufficient to accord full First
Amendment protection. 47 As Judge Wright noted in his dissent,
"[i]t can hardly be contended that cigarette commercials are 'contro-
versial speech' for purposes of the First Amendment based fairness
doctrine, yet mere 'product advertising' for purposes of the First
Amendment."'
Judge Wright's vigorous dissent offered a more thorough analysis
of the Smoking Act's constitutionality.'49 Wright evaluated the
history leading up to the Act's passage, including the cigarette
companies' complicity, and concluded that the Act violated the First
Amendment by "suppress[ing] the ventilation of [the smoking issue]
on the country's most pervasive communication vehicle.""15 Wright
noted the correlation between the airing of antismoking advertise-
ments mandated by the FCC and a decline in cigarette consumption,
and recognized the passage of the Act as a "dramatic legislative coup
for the tobacco industry" removing the smoking controversy from the
air.' Accordingly, he concluded that the legislation cut off debate
on the smoking controversy "just when Banzhaf had made such a
debate a real possibility.""15 This effect was inconsistent with the
in order to have standing an individual must present more than "[a]llegations of a subjec-
tive 'chill.' [There must be a] claim of specific present objective harm or threat of specific
future harm." Id at 13-14.
146. Capital Broadcasting Co., 333 F. Supp. at 591 n.25 (Wright, J., dissenting) (quoting
Supreme Court Justice White in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969)).
147. Id at 585.
148. id at 592 (Wright, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 587-94 (Wright, J., dissenting).
150. Id at 587 (Wright, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 589 (Wright, J., dissenting).
152. Id at 590 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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purposes underlying free speech; that "people will make the right
choice if presented with all points of view on a controversial is-
sue."'
153
Wright suggested that the Act could survive constitutional scru-
tiny by showing that the "advertising [was] not speech within the
meaning of the First Amendment or [if] it create[d] a clear and
present danger of such substantial magnitude that governmental
suppression is justified."'' Applying the second test, Wright
concluded that the cigarette advertisement did not rise to a level of
clear and present danger as the advertisements did not pose a threat
to state security. 55
Under the first test, Wright adopted the Banzhaf court's finding
that the commercial speech in question involved matters of public
controversy and argued that the speech deserved full First Amend-
ment protection due to its political component.5 6
The rulings in Banzhaf and Capital Broadcasting Co. were based
on the prevailing but ill-defined stature of commercial speech, which
was accorded less protection than political and artistic speech.5 7
Over the following two decades, the Supreme Court further defined
the parameters of protection for commercial speech, setting the stage
for the current debate.
IV. REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
A. Establishment of Broad Protection Under Virginia
Pharmacy Board
Broadly speaking, commercial speech falls within the scope of
protected speech under the First Amendment but receives less
protection than other forms of speech. Prior to the decision in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council,15 the Supreme Court danced around the issue of whether,
and to what extent, the First Amendment protected commercial
speech. 59
153. Id. (Wright, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 591 (Wright, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 593 (Wright, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 592 (Wright, J., dissenting).
157. Id at 591 (Wright, J., dissenting).
158. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
159. The Court first articulated a commercial-speech doctrine in Valentine v.
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In Virginia State Board, Justice Blackmun ruled for a consumer
group challenging a section of the Virginia Code that proscribed the
advertisement of prescription drugs."6  He noted that while past
decisions gave some indication that commercial speech was unprotect-
ed,'16' and at other times imposed protection because the speech in
question was not purely commercial, 62 the "Court has never denied
protection on the ground that the speech at issue was 'commercial
speech."' Blackmun, however, concluded that commercial speech
was not without limits. As an example, he suggested that commercial
speech could be regulated where the speech was false or mislead-
ingi6' or proposed an illegal transaction." In addition, the state
may place less burdensome time, place, and manner restrictions on
advertisements.'6
The Court in Virginia State Board ultimately established only
broad parameters for modem commercial speech law by concluding
that the state may not "completely suppress the dissemination of con-
cededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of
that information's effect upon its disseminators and its recipients."'67
The Court reserved delineating the scope of protection while
indicating that any restrictions intended to regulate the effect of
commercial speech on the audience would be disfavored."
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The Court ruled that commercial advertising was
unprotected. However during the 1970s the Court began to protect commercial speech
that did more than merely propose a commercial transaction and additionally, contained
matters of public interest. Patrick M. Garry, Commercial Speech, in THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 169 (Kermit L. Hall et al.
eds., 1992).
160. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (Michie 1974).
161. Virginia State Bed., 425 U.S. at 758 (citing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942) (noting the First Amendment forbids the banning of all communication by handbill
but does not restrain a narrow ban on purely commercial handbills)); Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (distinguishing proscribable door-to-door leafletting of
magazine subscriptions from leaflets publicizing a religious meeting).
162. Id. at 758-59 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
163. Id. at 759 (emphasis in original).
164. Id. at 771.
165. Id at 772.
166. Id at 771. Time, place, and manner restrictions have been approved where "they
are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, .. . serve a
significant governmental interest, and ... leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information." Id
167. Id at 773.
168. Id. at 773 n.25.
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In a vigorous dissent Justice Rehnquist derided the majority for
the breadth of the decision "extend[ing] the protection of [the First]
Amendment to purely commercial endeavors" and in the process
"elevat[ing] commercial intercourse between a seller hawking his
wares and a buyer seeking to strike a bargain to the same plane...
previously reserved for the free marketplace of ideas." 69 He sug-
gested that such a position would open the way for "active promotion
of... liquor, cigarettes, and other products the use of which it has
previously been thought desirable to discourage."'7
B. Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech Protection
In 1980 the Supreme Court effectively limited the scope of
protection for commercial speech under the First Amendment. The
Court's decision in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission'.' established a four-part test to evaluate the
constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech. This test
may effectively foreclose the continued promotion of cigarettes.
Justice Powell's opinion in Central Hudson extended the Virginia
State Board holding that the First Amendment protects commercial
speech from unwarranted governmental regulation. Simultaneous-
ly, it recognized "'the "common-sense" distinction between speech
proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area tradition-
ally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of
speech.""'74 Tying these two positions together, the Court conclud-
ed that the "Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expres-
sion."'7 Such protection was further limited to commercial speech
that "accurately inform[s] the public about lawful activity."'176
From this premise Justice Powell built a four-part test." As
a threshold issue to determine whether the expression falls within
169. Id. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
170. Id (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
171. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 566. Justice Powell articulated his position along with three separate
concurring opinions by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, and a dissent from
Justice Rehnquist.
174. Id- at 562 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,455-56 (1978)).
175. Id. at 563 (citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456-57).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 566.
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First Amendment protection, the speech "must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading."'7 8 From there the Court asks "whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial."'79  An affirmative'
answer to the first two questions leads to a determination of "whether
the regulation directly advances the governmental interest assert-
ed"'" and finally "whether [the regulation] is not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest."''
C. Alternate Characterization of the Central Hudson Test
The Central Hudson test is perhaps better characterized as a two-
step analysis comprised of five issues." Under the first step, the
court must determine whether a constitutional analysis is required.
This inquiry includes two distinct threshold issues: whether the
speech is commercial, and whether it is not misleading or concerning
an illegal activity. An affirmative answer to these two questions leads
to the second step of the analysis under which the court determines
whether the regulation impinging on protected commercial speech is
narrowly tailored to directly affect a substantial government inter-
est.1
1. Threshold issue 1: is the speech commercial?
Any analysis of commercial speech regulations requires the court
to determine whether the restricted speech is in fact commercial,
enjoying limited protection, or noncommercial and thus entitled to full
First Amendment protection.
a. should commercial speech be distinguished from noncommercial
speech?
In Central Hudson Justice Blackmun denounced the application
of the intermediate scrutiny four-part test "when a State seeks to
suppress information about a product in order to manipulate a private
178. 1&
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. I
182. In Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995), both the majority and
the dissent referred to a "three part test" using the original Central Hudson prong number
one "false or illegal speech" inquiry as a prerequisite to the application of the test. Id. at
2376, 2382.
183. Central Hudson Gas & Elea Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
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economic decision that the State cannot or has not regulated or
outlawed directly."'" Blackmun concluded that "[n]o differences
between commercial speech and other protected speech justify
suppression of commercial speech in order to influence public conduct
through manipulation of the availability of information."'" Black-
mun characterized such restrictions as "a covert attempt by the State
to manipulate the choices of its citizens, ... [insulating the State]
from the visibility and scrutiny that direct regulation would en-
tail. 1
86
In the subsequent case of Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc v.
Tourism Co.,' Justice Brennan suggested that the government's
interest in the regulation of content in commercial speech is limited
to preventing the "dissemination of information that is false, decep-
tive, or misleading, or that proposes an illegal transaction. 1" 8 s
Brennan supported his position by citing the Court's consistent
invalidation of "restrictions designed to deprive consumers of accurate
information about products and services legally offered for sale.'
' 89
In his opinion "no differences between commercial and other kinds
of speech justify protecting commercial speech less extensively where
... the government seeks to manipulate private behavior by depriving
citizens of truthful information concerning lawful activities," and any
"such regulation should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny."'"
By contrast, Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Central Hudson,9'
continued his disapproval of any scheme that "fails to give due
deference to [the] subordinate position of commercial speech."'"
While admitting that
184. Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 578 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 574-75 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
187. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
188. Id. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). This opinion suggests that
Justice Brennan would radically alter the first step in the Central Hudson test so that the
entire test applies'only where the commercial speech concerns unlawful activity or is mis-
leading or fraudulent.
189. Id. (citing Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678, 700-02 (1977); Linmark Assoc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)).
190. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
191. 447 U.S. at 583 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 589 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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[t]he line between "commercial speech," and the kind of
speech that those who drafted the First Amendment had in
mind, may not be a technically or intellectually easy one to
draw.., it surely produced.., fewer problems than has the
development of judicial doctrine in this area since Virginia
Pharmacy Board [sic]."
b. distinguishing commercial speech from pure speech
Despite Rehnquist's conclusion, the line between commercial and
noncommercial speech remains problematically elusive. In part this
difficulty lies in the fact that advertising implicitly contains an
informational component often extending beyond the proposal of a
commercial transaction.
, In Bigelow v. Virginia94 the Court alluded to this problem in
striking down a Virginia statute that made any advertisement
"encourag[ing] or prompt[ing] the procuring of abortion or miscar-
riage ... a misdemeanor."'9 Justice Blackmun noted that "[t]he
existence of 'commercial activity, in itself, is no justification for
narrowing the protection of expression secured by the First Amend-
ment.' 1196
While the Court previously ruled that an advertiser cannot evade
a restrictive ordinance by appending a message of public interest,'"
the Bigelow Court concluded that the abortion advertisements "did
more than simply propose a commercial transaction. It contained
factual material of clear 'public interest."" 9' Under the majority's
analysis, the portion of the advertisement stating that abortions were
legal in the State of New York communicated information and
disseminated an opinion."
193. Id at 598 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
194. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
195. Id at 812-13 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (Michie 1960)).
196. Id at 818 (quoting Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966)).
197. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942).
198. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822.
199. Justice Stevens noted that
Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed information of potential
interest and value to a diverse audience-not only to readers possibly in need
of the services offered, but also to those with a general curiosity about, or
genuine interest in, the subject matter or the law of another State and its
development, and to readers seeking reform in Virginia.
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Years later, in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,2" Justice
Stevens suggested that Bigelow was not about the issue of abortion
but rather "about paternalism, and informational protectionism ...
[and the] citizens' fundamental constitutional right to travel in a state
of enlightenment, not government-induced ignorance."2''  The
weight of the underlying issue cannot, however, be minimized so
easily. At the time of the Bigelow decision, the political issue of
abortion was growing in intensity, creating a particularly charged
context for this decision. In fact, the Bigelow Court gave substantial
weight to the fact that the activity in question, abortion, "pertained
to... constitutional interests of the general public."'
Ultimately, it is difficult to assess the impact of Bigelow. The
Court did not conclude that the pure speech elements of the
advertisements elevated the commercial speech to pure speech nor
any intermediate position, but rather imbued commercial speech with
a greater purpose.
The Virginia State Board3 decision took this position a step
further. The Court suggested that commercial speech itself serves
purposes akin to pure speech, contributing to the free flow of
important commercial information which is, arguably, of clear public
interest. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun suggested that
the suppression of prescription drug information harmed marginalized
groups such as the poor, sick, and elderly who spend a disproportion-
ate amount of their income on prescription drugs and lack the ability
to comparison shop. In this context, the free flow of commercial
information was "indispensable to the formation of intelligent opin-
ions." °5
In Central Hudson Justice Stevens added to the debate his
concern that "the commercial speech concept not be defined too
broadly lest speech deserving of greater constitutional protection be
inadvertently suppressed."'  Stevens addressed the two "defini-
tions" of commercial speech suggested by the majority's opinion and
found one too broad and the other somewhat too narrow.2°7
200. 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2710 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822.
203. 425 U.S. 748 (1975).
204. Id. at 763.
205. Id. at 765.
206. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., concurring).
207. Id. at 579-80 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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The Court's first description of speech as "expression related
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience""
could encompass "speech that is entitled to the maximum protection
afforded by the First Amendment."' Stevens offered as examples
the exhortations of a labor leader and an economist's dissertation on
the money supply. In addition, he rejected the economic motivation
of the speaker as a qualification for constitutional protection.210
This broad definition would include almost all disseminations by a
cigarette manufacturer as commercial speech subject to regulation
depending on the scope of the term "economic interests."
The majority's second description referred to the language in the
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n decision describing commercial
speech as "'speech proposing a commercial transaction." 21' Ste-
vens interpreted this definition as-limited to speech intended to advise
consumers of the availability, price, and desirability of a product, and
perhaps communications "that do little more than make the name of
a product or a service more familiar to the general public.)
212
The open letter to President Clinton written by Richard Petty
213
illuminates the disparate application of Central Hudson's two
descriptions. Despite being a paid advertisement by a cigarette
company, the letter clearly articulates a political and ideological
position without proposing a commercial transaction. At the same
time, the ad relates to the economic interest of the speaker in the
protection of its ability to market its product for a profit. Nonethe-
less, as a political statement, this advertisement should enjoy the
greatest amount of First Amendment protection.1 4
Certainly, ideology itself is not sufficient. The "Joe Camel"
campaign run by its parent R.J.Reynolds often emphasizes how cool
smoking is, as much as it proposes a commercial transaction. In fact,
208. Id. at 561.
209. Id. at 579 (Stevens, J., concurring).
210. Id. at 580 (Stevens, J., concurring). "Some of our most valued forms of fully
protected speech are uttered for profit." Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482
(1989).
211. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)).
212. Id. at 580 (Stevens, J., concurring).
213. See R.J.R. Advertisement, supra note 22, at C5.
214. "Discussion of public issues ... [is] integral to the operation of the system of
government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest
protection to such political expression .... ." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
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critics have argued that the campaign specifically targets children,21
a portion of the population which is not allowed to purchase
cigarettes.216 Therefore, the purpose of the ads becomes more ideo-
logical, if not illegal, promoting cigarette smoking in general and
developing brand loyalty in contemplation of future sales. However,
as one critic suggests "in commercial speech ... there is an implicit
ideology in favor of market-ordering, and perhaps some sort of ide-
ology involving the product advertised. But that fact does not justify
a conclusion that courts should accord such speech the highest level
of constitutional protection.
217
In Central Hudson Stevens suggested that it was "too early to
enunciate an exact formulation" of commercial speech but he was
"persuaded that it should not include the entire range of communica-
tion that is embraced within the term 'promotional advertising.2 " 1
More recently in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,219 in which the parties
actually stipulated to the fact that the information on beer labels,
including alcohol content, constituted commercial speech,' Justice
Stevens nonetheless revisited this issue in his concurring opinion."
He warned that "the borders of the commercial speech category are
not nearly as clear as the Court has assumed"'  and suggested that
the labeling case illustrated the "artificiality of a rigid commer-
cial/noncommercial distinction."' At issue was a law precluding
the labeling of alcohol content on beer products. Stevens suggested
that the statement of alcohol content probably would not be
considered commercial if it were published by a consumer group. 4
215. John Schwartz, Elders Takes Aim at Teenage Smoking, WASH. POST, Feb. 25,1994,
at Al.
216. At least forty-four states prohibit the sale of tobacco products to minors. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 118950 (West 1988). Moreover, the Department of Health
and Human Services recently issued a final rule requiring states to pass and enforce laws
prohibiting the sale and distribution of tobacco products to minors in order to receive
block grants for substance abuse prevention and treatment services. Tobacco Regulation
for Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grants, 61 Fed. Reg. 1492 (1996)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 96).
217. Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589,607.
218. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 580 (Stevens, J., concurring).
219. 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1589 (1995).
220. Id
221. Id at 1594 (Stevens, J., concurring).
222. Id. at 1595 (Stevens, J., concurring).
223. Id (Stevens, J., concurring).
224. Id (Stevens, J., concurring).
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He therefore concluded that the content itself was not dispositive as
to whether the speech was commercial.'
Despite Stevens' position, case law indicates that pure speech
elements or analogous attributes merely justify limited protection of
commercial speech. None of these cases suggest an amount of pure
speech sufficient to require greater protection.
Furthermore, Board of Trustees v. Fox' implied that before
the Court will assess this issue it will first determine whether the pure
speech is "'inextricably intertwined"' with the commercial speech.227
Fox involved a challenge of a state university regulation precluding
private commercial enterprise from operating on campus.221 Student
plaintiffs could not throw "Tupperware Parties" which consisted of
the demonstration and sale of Tupperware products but also included
lectures on financial responsibility and running an efficient home.229
.The students argued that the restricted commercial speech was
"inextricably intertwined" with pure speech and therefore must be
classified as noncommercial to protect the pure speech elements'
The Court concluded that there was "nothing whatever 'inextricable'
about the noncommercial aspects of these presentations. No law of
man ... makes it impossible to ... teach home economics without
selling housewares."'" Advertising which "'links a product to a
current debate' is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection
afforded noncommercial speech." 2  This decision suggests that an
advertising campaign such as that run by Philip Morris to promote
their Benson & Hedges brand, 3 which directly acknowledges the
debate over secondhand smoke while proposing a commercial
225. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
226. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
227. 1& at 474 (quoting Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781,796 (1988)).
228. Id at 471-72 (citing State Univ. of N.Y. Res. 66-156 (1979)).
229. Id. at 473-74.
230. Id. at 474 (citing Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988)).
231. Id
232. Id. at 475 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5).
233. One ad runs the following copy over a photo of smokers riding atop a commuter
train: "These days, commuters can't climb aboard with a cigarette. For a great smoke,
travel the scenic route." The ad includes a yin/yang type symbol with the line, "Finally,
a welcome sign for both smokers and nonsmokers. Call 1-800-494-5444 for more
information." Advertisement, Philip Morris Inc., Benson & Hedges 100: The Length You
Go to for Pleasure (1995) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). Business
establishments use this symbol to denote that they participate in an "accommodation
program." PHILIP MORRIS, HEY, SMOKERS IT PAYS TO VOICE YOUR CHOICE (1994) (on
file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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transaction, will find no greater protection under the commercial-
speech doctrine. In such a case, the secondhand smoke ideology
could be extracted and expressed outside of the commercial context.
c. are cigarette ads more than mere commercial speech?
When the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Banzhafv. FCC upheld the FCC's decision, it based its holding on the
conclusion that "cigarette advertising implicitly states a position on a
matter of public controversy."'- In Capital Broadcasting Co. v.
Mitchell, district court Judge Skelly Wright seized upon this language
in his dissent to argue that "[i]t can hardly be contended that cigarette
commercials are 'controversial speech' for purposes of the First
Amendment based fairness doctrine, yet mere 'product advertising'
for purposes of the First Amendment."'"z5
By contrast, the Capital Broadcasting majority, in dicta, 6 drew
upon the Banzhaf court's conclusion that the
advertisements ... present no information or arguments in
favor of smoking which might contribute to the public
debate. Accordingly, even if cigarette commercials are
protected speech ... they are at best a negligible 'part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of... slight social value as
a step to truth."'
The district court therefore concluded that "[t]he fact that cigarette
advertising is covered by the FCC's fairness doctrine does not require
a finding that it is to be given full First Amendment protection."'-" 8
Thus, the two major decisions directly addressing the proscription
of cigarette advertising suggest that the position on a matter of public
controversy implicitly stated by broadcast advertisements was insuf-
ficient to raise the speech to the level of fully protected pure speech.
d. application to the FDA proposal
Under the current language of the FDA proposal, the regulations
sweep too broadly 39 as they apply to any "[a]dvertising which bears
234. Banzhaf v. F.C.C., 405 F.2d 1082, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
235. 333 F. Supp. 582, 587 (1971) (Wright, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 585.
237. Banzhaf, 405 F.2d at 1102 (citations omitted).
238. Capital Broadcasting Co., 333 F. Supp. at 585 (footnote omitted).
239. Although overbreadth "does not normally apply to commercial speech" due to its
"hardy" nature, the challenge does apply to noncommercial speech. See Fox, 492 U.S. at
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the cigarette or smokeless tobacco product brand name ... or any
other indicia of tobacco product identification. ', 2' This language
suggests that the proposed restrictions will apply to any advertise-
ment, regardless of content, unconstitutionally sweeping up pure
speech sponsored by a brand-name product and possibly by its parent
company. Campaigns such as R.J.Reynolds's "Together, We Can
Work it Out," and Philip Morris's "Our Position Word by Word,"241
may be precluded based on their tobacco product identification.
2. Threshold issue 2: neither misleading nor related
to an unlawful act
As a second threshold issue to determine whether the expression
falls within First Amendment protection, the speech "must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading."'24 Unlike the first threshold
issue determining whether the speech will receive limited or full
protection, a negative answer to this question will result in no
protection.' 4 While there is no doubt that cigarette smoking is a
legal act, Congressman Henry Waxman and other commentators
suggest that cigarette ads fall outside of the Central Hudson test and
therefore the protection of the First Amendment because cigarette
ads are inherently misleading.2'
A bill introduced in the House of Representatives in 1990
explicitly noted that "[t]hrough advertisements during and sponsorship
of sporting events, tobacco has become strongly associated with sports
and has become deceptively portrayed as an integral part of sports and
the healthy lifestyle associated with rigorous sporting activity.)
245
While such an inference may be drawn from print ads portraying
smokers playing sports, arguably the mere placement of trademarks
at sporting events falls short of this inference, as the athletes
themselves are generally not seen smoking.
481-82.
240. 60 Fed. Reg. 41,374 (1995) (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(a)(1)).
241. See Advertisement, We want you to know where we stand, Our position, word by
word: Youth, HARPER'S MAG., Dec. 1995, at 23. This campaign sets out Philip Morris'
position on underage smoking, including their Action Against Access program designed
to prevent minors from having access to cigarettes.
242. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
243. Id. at 563.
244. See Kenneth L. Polin, Argument for the Ban of Tobacco Advertising: A First
Amendment Analysis, 17 HOFsTRA L. REV. 99, 113 (1988); Steven W. Colford, Cigarette
ad hearings spark July fireworks, ADVERTISING AGE, June 16, 1986, at 1, 90.
245. H.R. 5041, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990) (emphasis added).
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Waxman has since backed away from this position. Language in
a more recent bill states that a "failure to provide adequate and
complete health warnings and labeling information to fully inform
consumers about the risks and dangers of tobacco use is mislead-ing. , ,1246
While commentators suggest that the portrayal of healthy
smokers in ads is deceptive,247 tobacco industry representatives
counter that "[m]ost persons in their twenties and thirties, whether
smokers or not, look perfectly normal and healthy. The models used
in cigarette advertising are not more attractive, healthy or successful
looking than the models used in most advertising."'
Finally, it has been persuasively argued that awareness of the
detrimental health effects of smoking is high enough to preclude any
claim that consumers will be otherwise misled.249 Thus, it is likely
that cigarette advertising will not be found to be misleading under the
Central Hudson formulation.
3. Three-part constitutional analysis
a. evolving standard of review
Despite Justice Rehnquist's concern expressed in his dissent in
Central Hudson that the four-part test would "elevate ... the
protection accorded commercial speech.., to a level that is virtually
indistinguishable from that of noncommercial speech,"'  subse-
quent case law suggests that the Court will apply a standard of review
falling far short of strict scrutiny. As articulated below within the
246. H.R. 3614, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1993).
247. Randall H. Stoner, Note, 200 MPH Cigarette Ads: A Comparison of International
Restrictions on Tobacco Sports Sponsorship, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 639,654
(1992) (citing David Elsner, Smoking Ads Seep Through Loopholes: Nations' Bans Lost
in a Cloud of Thin Disguises, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 16, 1986, at C3).
248. Smoking Prevention Education Act" Hearings on H.R. 1824 Before the Subcomm.
on Health and the Environment of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 518 (1983) (comments of the Tobacco Institute on the FTC Staff Report on the
Cigarette Advertising Investigation).
249. Paul J. Weber & Greg Marks, Debate on the Constitutionality and Desirability of
a Tobacco-Products Advertising Ban, 15 N. KY. L. REV. 57, 69 (1988); see also, Tobacco
Control and Health Protection Act Hearings on H.R. 5041 Before the Subcomm. on Health
and the Environment of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 581-83
(1990) (statement of Gerald M. Goldhaber, Ph.D.) (noting that surveys suggested that
more Americans were aware of the dangers of smoking than could name George
Washington as the first president).
250. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 591 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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discussion of the individual prongs, the Court has applied a standard
of review ranging from total deference to a level which can be, at
best, described as meaningful review.
Initial decisions, such as Posadas de Puerto Rico Assn. v. Tourism
Co.," suggest that judicial deference to legislative conclusions, and
the harmful nature of cigarettes, handicap cigarette manufacturers.
However, the more recent opinion in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. 2
rejects a harmful products exception and requires a more strict
showing by the government that a proposed restriction directly and
actually advances a substantial interest, and that the restriction is
narrowly tailored to avoid interference with First Amendment rights.
It is not surprising that a number of decisions upholding restric-
tions on commercial speech under the Central Hudson test involve
underlying activities deemed potentially harmful to the public. The
second test of "substantial government interest" virtually guarantees
that some harm is contemplated. However, two cases predating
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co."3 suggest that a deferential standard
applies where the underlying activity is deemed socially harmful, as
is the case with cigarette advertising.
The Court initially applied this deferential standard in Posadas
de Puerto Rico Assn. v. Tourism Co.,' a case involving the regula-
tion of advertising by gambling casinos. While the opinion did not
expressly articulate a "harmful activities" exception to Central
Hudson, one subsequent Supreme Court decision and the FDA
interpret the harmful nature of gambling as justifying the deferential
standard of review." This interpretation is due in part to Justice
Rehnquist's dicta distinguishing the constitutional protection granted
to the advertisement in Carey v. Population Services Internationalp
6
and Bigelow v. Virginiae7 from that provided to the advertisements
in Posadas. "In Carey and Bigelow, the underlying conduct that was
the subject of the advertising restrictions was constitutionally
protected and could not have been prohibited by the State.""8 By
251. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
252. 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).
253. Id
254. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
255. See United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993); 60 Fed. Reg.
41,314, 41,355 (1995).
256. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
257. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
258. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345.
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contrast "the Puerto Rico Legislature surely could have prohibited
casino gambling." 9 Rehnquist suggested that this "greater power to
completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power
to ban advertising of casino gambling.' '21 The FDA seized upon
this language, concluding that because the agency could ban the sale
or distribution of tobacco products, "the lesser steps of regulating
labeling and advertising and requiring manufacturers to fund a
government approved educational campaign are reasonable."26' If
this conclusion is true, however, the protection of commercial speech
is truly emasculated given the broad range of commercial activities
which may be completely banned. Rehnquist's decision is, perhaps,
better explained by his disdain for the original conception of Central
Hudson.
262
Nonetheless, seven years after the Posadas decision, the Supreme
Court indicated its approval of special treatment for harmful activities
in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.2" The Court noted that
the statute restricting advertising of lotteries in nonlottery states
involved a substantial government interest because "the activity
underlying the relevant advertising-gambling-implicates no constitu-
tionally protected right; rather, it falls into a category of 'vice' activity
that could be, and frequently has been, banned altogether.
26 4
Furthermore, in discussing the quality of the fit between the regula-
tion and the asserted government interest, the Court cited exclusively
to examples of speech involving harmful activities when arguing that
the reduction in demand is the goal of restrictions.
26
Under the restrictive standard established in Posadas and Edge
Broadcasting, any challenge to a ban on cigarette advertising would
likely encounter the lower standard of scrutiny given the well-docu-
mented dangers associated with the product. However, more recently
in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,26 the Court rejected the govern-
ment's contention that legislatures have "broader latitude to regulate
speech that promotes socially harmful activities. '267 Writing for the
259. Id.
260. Id. at 345-46.
261. 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,355.
262. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 583-84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
263. 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
264. Id. at 2703.
265. Id. at 2707.
266. 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).
267. Id. at 1590 n.2.
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majority, Justice Thomas concluded that "[n]either Edge Broadcasting
nor Posadas compels us to craft an exception to the Central Hudson
standard" because both cases were decided on the Central Hudson
test, and the harmful activity language appeared in response to
alternate arguments.2m
While a harmful activity exception would clearly doom a chal-
lenge to cigarette advertising restrictions, such an exception is still
preferable to the application of a deferential standard across the
board.
b. substantial government interest
Under the Central Hudson formulation, the Court next asks
"whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.
269
Articulation of the specific government interest is important in order
to justify the need for regulation, and also plays a crucial role in
determining whether the regulation directly advances, and is narrowly
tailored toward, an important end. As the scope of the substantial
interest grows, the Central Hudson requirement that the regulations
be narrowly tailored becomes more difficult to satisfy. Accordingly,
both the standard of review and the precision in articulating the
substantial interests become critical.
In Posadas, the first major decision incorporating the substantial
government interest standard, the Supreme Court applied a complete-
ly deferential standard of review accepting without discussion the
Puerto Rico Superior Court's conclusions that a substantial govern-
ment interest existed in protecting the Puerto Rican citizens from the
harmful effects of casino gambling.27 In a compelling dissent
Justice Brennan sharply criticized the majority's application of Central
Hudson,27' pointing out that nothing in the statute or its legislative
history supported the Puerto Rico Superior Court's conclusion that
residents would suffer serious harm from casino advertising.2'
Furthermore, the asserted substantial interests were actually articulat-
ed by the defendant Tourism Board, not the legislature. 3 Brennan
noted that "a court may not.., simply speculate about valid reasons
268. lId
269. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
270. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341.
271. Id at 348-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
272. Id at 352-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
273. Id at 341.
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that the government might have for enacting such restrictions.
Rather, the government ultimately bears the burden [of] justify[ing]
the challenged regulation, and... prov[ing] that the interests it seeks
to further are real and substantial."'274
Seven years later the Edenfield v. Fane275 Court attempted to
place some common-sense restrictions on the application of the
Central Hudson test. In determining that a Florida code section
banning personal solicitation by certified public accountants was
unconstitutional, the Court emphasized the importance of identifying
the actual substantial interests asserted by the state.276 Under the
Edenfield interpretation of the Central Hudson test, the Posadas
regulations would not survive as the Court impermissibly "sup-
plant[ed] the precise interests put forward by the State with other sup-
positions"2' by adopting the conclusions of the Superior Court
drawn from assumptions and the Tourism Board's brief rather than
the legislation itself.27
However, one month after the Edenfield decision, the Court
seemed to take a step backwards. In Edge Broadcasting7 9 the
Court wholly ignored its Edenfield standards when it upheld an
amended section of the Communications Act of 1934° which
limited advertising of lotteries to broadcasters within the state that
conducts the lottery."s In a decision written by Justice White, the
Court suggested that "as in Posadas ... the Government obviously
legislated on the premise that the advertising of gambling serves to
increase the demand for the advertised product."' -
Justice White's opinion demonstrates the importance of carefully
shaping the substantial interest. While the lower court located the
government interest in the restriction of all advertisements directed
at the nonlottery state, m White placed the locus "in supporting the
policy of nonlottery States, as well as not interfering with the policy
274. Id. at 355 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
275. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
276. Id. at 1798.
277. Id.
278. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 334, 341.
279. 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
280. 48 Stat. 1064, 1088 (1934) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1307 (1988 & Supp.
III 1992)).
281. Id. at 1088.
282. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2707 (citing Posadas, 478 U.S. at 344).
283. Id. at 2703-04 (citing Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 956 F.2d 263 (4th
Cir. 1992)).
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of States that permit lotteries."'' This distinction is subtle, yet
important, in understanding the Court's application of the subsequent
elements of the Central Hudson test. It is far easier to state that the
restriction directly advances the goal of supporting the nonlottery-
state policies than to justify the interest in restricting the advertise-
ment directed at the nonlottery state. Any level of reduction in
listeners resulting from the Act directly advances the interest of
supporting the nonlottery-state policy. By contrast, the interest in
restricting lottery advertisments directed at nonlottery states is
subverted by the Act's failure to regulate lottery-state broadcasters
transmitting into nonlottery states.
In his dissent in Edge Broadcasting, Justice Stevens sharply
criticized Justice White's decision, pointing out the danger of
manipulating the substantial government interest?85 He noted that
"[u]nless justified by a truly substantial governmental interest, this
extreme, and extremely paternalistic, measure surely cannot withstand
scrutiny under the First Amendment.
',1 6
Just two years after its reversal in Edge Broadcasting, the Court
in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.' expressly declined to apply the
deferential standard of review and avoided the temptation to
manipulate the government interest to achieve a desired holding."
In 1987 the Coors Brewing Company applied for approval of
proposed beer labels and accompanying advertisements which
disclosed the alcohol content of the beer.8 9 The application was
rejected based on a section of the Federal Alcohol Administration
Act of 193529g prohibiting disclosure of the alcohol content of beer
on labels or in advertising.291  The government's primary contention
284. Ia at 2703. The Court also noted that "the activity underlying the relevant
advertising-gambling-implicates no constitutionally protected right; rather, it falls into
a category of 'vice' activity that could be, and frequently has been, banned altogether."
Id See supra part IV.C.3.a. for a discussion of Edge Broadcasting and commercial speech
involving harmful activities.
285. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2710 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
286. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
287. 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).
288. I1d at 1590 n.2. See supra note 265 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
significance of footnote 2 in the rejection of a harmful activities exception to the
commercial-speech doctrine.
289. Id. at 1588. Coors suggested that its products suffered from consumer
misperception about their alchohol content. Id. at 1592.
290. 27 U.S.C. § 205(e)(2) (1994).
291. Section 205(e)(2) provides that "statements of, or statements likely to be
considered statements of, alcoholic content of malt beverages are prohibited unless
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was that Congress enacted the ban to curb strength wars among brew-
ers.292 Coors countered that Congress created the ban to prevent
brewers from making inaccurate claims concerning alcohol, noting
that at the time of the Act, brewers could not produce beer within
predictable alcohol levels.2' Because this is no longer a problem,
they suggested that the substantial government interest no longer
existed.294 While the Court considered this argument plausible, it
accepted the government's "significant interest in protecting the
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens by preventing brewers from
competing on the basis of alcohol strength."'295 However, the
Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the government failed to
demonstrate that the prohibition prevented strength wars,296 noting
that the Act applies an opposite policy to wine and distilled spir-
its.
297
In the case of the FDA proposal, the express purpose of the
regulations is to "[r]educe the number of people under 18 years of age
who become addicted to nicotine," and to "[p]rovide important
information regarding the use of these products to users and potential
users."298  There is little doubt of the continuing substantiality of
this interest. However, the success of the proposal under the balance
of the Central Hudson test turns on the regulations' fit with these
precise goals. As demonstrated below, certain sections of the
proposal are susceptible to the argument that they are neither
narrowly tailored nor directly advance these precise goals. These
conclusions, however, rely on the presumption that the Court will
respect the expressed purposes of the proposal.
The FDA's own analysis of the proposal under the First
Amendment suggests a "substantial government interest [in] protect-
ing the public health."'29 9 While this interest may be valid in itselW
it is not the interest expressed by the proposal. Throughout the
proposal, the FDA focuses its analysis on advertising targeted at
required by State law." lit
292. Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1590.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1591.
296. Id
297. Id at 1590. Section 205(e)(2) requires the disclosure of alcohol content on labels
of wines and spirits. See 27 C.F.R. § 4.36 (wines), § 5.37 (distilled spirits) (1994).
298. 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,373 (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.2).
299. Id. at 41,354.
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minors and expressly states that the proposed rule is "intended to
help prevent persons younger than 18 years of age from becoming
addicted... by reducing the appeal of... cigarettes [to]... persons
under 18 years of age."'" In fact, the proposal expressly disclaims
a desire to regulate advertising targeted at adults301 noting that adult
smokers' brand preferences correlate with price value, not with brand
advertising2' The balance of the present analysis of the FDA
proposal under Central Hudson is predicated on this more narrow
government interest.
c directly advances state interest
In determining the constitutionality of the fit between the means
of the FDA's proposed regulations and the goal of reducing underage
smoking, a court must first determine whether the regulations directly
advance the state interest °3  As suggested above, this analysis will
turn on the standard of review of both the underlying substantial
interest and the regulation's ability to directly advance this interest.
The FDA's First Amendment analysis incorrectly concludes that the
current standard of review under this prong allows the Court to
"defer to the 'common-sense judgments' of the regulatory agency as
long as they are not unreasonable."'"
The Court initially applied such a deferential standard in
Posadas.3°5 Following the Court's deferential determination of the
underlying interests, it concluded that restrictions on advertising of
casinos would in fact restrain the demand for casino gambling.3"
However, the substantial interest in Posadas was not simply to reduce
demand but rather to discourage "the risks associated with casino
gambling [which were determined to be] significantly greater than
those associated with the more traditional kinds of gambling in Puerto
Rico."'" Accordingly, Justice Brennan, in his dissent, attacked the
majority's conclusion that the ban directly advanced the range of
300. Id. at 41,322.
301. Id. at 41,323 (selecting an age limit of 18 as consistent with the 1992 Alchohol,
Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration Reorganiztion Act).
302. Id. at 41,332.
303. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
304. 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,354 (citing Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,
509 (1981)).
305. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
306. Id. at 341-42.
307. Id. at 343.
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specific interests accepted by the Court."°8 These interests included
the "disruption of moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local
crime, the fostering of prostitution, the development of corruption,
and the infiltration of organized crime."3" Brennan suggested that
these harmful effects would exist regardless of the ad ban by virtue of
the very existence of casino gambling.
310
In Edenfield v. Fane?" the Court tightened the standard of
review for this prong, requiring a determination of "whether the chal-
lenged regulation advances these interests in a direct and material
way. 3 12 However, two months later the Court seemed to retreat
from this position in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.3" when
Justice White suggested that the decreasing demand for gambling
directly advances the interest, despite substantial evidence that the
restriction had only a marginal, if not insignificant, impact on the
demand for the out-of-state lottery?
14
The current standard of review is controlled by the recent case
of Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.311 in which the Court expressly
applied the Edenfield formulation requiring that "the challenged
regulation advances the Government's interest 'in a direct and mater-
ial way.' ,316  Under this formulation, the government carries the
burden which "'is not satisfied by mere speculation and conjecture,"'
but instead "'must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and
that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material de-
gree.' ,317
While the tobacco industry continues to assert that advertising
does not create smokers but instead cultivates brand loyalty,3 8
statistics belie this fact.31 1 "According to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, after the Joe Camel advertising campaign,
which depicts a camel wearing sunglasses and driving a fancy car,
308. Id. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
309. Id. at 341.
310. Id at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
311. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
312. Id. at 1798 (emphasis added).
313. 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
314. Id. at 2707-08.
315. 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).
316. Id. at 1592 (quoting Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1798).
317. Id. (quoting Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1800).
318. Clayton, supra note 28, at 25 (quoting Anne Browder, assistant to the president
of the Tobacco Institute).
319. Gleick, supra note 6, at 33.
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began in 1988, the proportion of teenage smokers who prefer[ed]
Camels more than tripled."3" However, studies in other countries
that have imposed complete bans on tobacco advertisements are less
conclusive and suggest that other factors play a role in declining
smoking statistics.3 '
The tobacco industry has also claimed that a ban on sponsorship
and other advertising will actually result in higher consumption.'
2
Manufacturers assert that a ban would merely reduce their advertising
costs allowing them to pass the savings on to the consumer in the
form of lower prices, thereby stimulating demand. 3D However, as
one commentator indicates, this rationale clearly lacks force as "it
would indicate that it is in the tobacco companies' best economic
interests to stop advertising and ... increase consumption., 324 This
latter interpretation is somewhat simplistic. Without government-
mandated restrictions on advertising, no single cigarette manufacturer
could afford to be the first to abandon advertising for fear of losing
its market share.
While the proposal itself suggests only that "advertising and
labeling may make young people more receptive to using.., tobacco
pr6ducts and ... [that the proposal] may reduce the potential harm
to young people, ,32S common sense suggests that restrictions on
advertisements targeted at minors will have some effect on demand
and thus will advance the government's interest. The question
remains whether this interest is sufficient to warrant the intrusion on
free speech rights under the individual provisions of the FDA
proposal.
Empirical studies, demonstrating the positive visual appeal to
young people of color graphics2 6 and the use of cartoon salesper-
320. Id.
321. For a comprehensive analysis of tobacco advertising bans in foreign countries, and
the resulting impact, see Stoner, supra note 247, at 658-63.
322. Stoner, supra note 247, at 656.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,354 (emphasis added).
326. See Margaret F. Callcott & Patricia A. Alvey, Toons Sell... and sometimes they
don'" An Advertising Spokes-Character Typology and Exploratory Study, in PROC. OF THE
1991 CONF. OF THE AM. ACADEMY OF ADVERTISING 43-52 (1991); Donald Wayne
Hendon, How Mechanical Factors Affect Ad Perception, J. OF ADVERTISING RES., Aug.
1973, at 39, 39-45; P. Huang et al., Black-White Differences in Appeal of Cigarette
Advertising Among Adolescents, 1 TOBACCO CONTROL 249-55 (1992); John R. Rossiter
& Larry Percy, Attitude Change Through Visual Imagery in Advertising, 9 J. OF
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sons,327 support the black-and-white, text-only restriction on print
ads3"s and the prohibition of billboards "within 1,000 feet of any
playground, elementary ... or secondary school., 329  However,
critics have challenged the conclusions3 ' and methodology3 3 of
those studies and conducted manufacturer-sponsored studies of their
own.332 This led at least one commentator to conclude that "[m]ore
direct evidence is necessary to link a ban of [cartoon characters] to a
decrease in the number of children who smoke cigarettes."'333
The FDA's proposed ban on the sale and distribution of branded
nontobacco products is predicated on the effective message arguments
noted above, as well as the particular appeal of these products to
underage smokers and their penetration into the underage market.
T-shirts, head gear, and sporting goods allow minors to associate
themselves with a product reserved for adults3 4 and enable those
with little disposable income to get "something for nothing., 3 5  In
turn, these products enter places, where such ads are otherwise
precluded, as status symbols and ultimately "walking billboard[s]. 336
The FDA proposal devotes a great deal of effort supporting the
ban on motor sport sponsorships through evidence demonstrating the
general effectiveness of these marketing avenues. 337 However, the
FDA concedes that specific "[e]vidence regarding sponsorship's
impact on young people is somewhat limited., 338 The proposal cites
ADVERTISING, 10-16 (1980).
327. Joseph R. DiFranza et al., RJR Nabisco's Cartoon Camel Promotes Camel
Cigarettes to Children, 266 JAMA 3149 (1991); Fischer, supra note 41, at 3146; John P.
Pierce et al., Does Tobacco Advertising Target Young People to Start Smoking?, 266
JAMA 3154 (1991).
328. 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,374 (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.32(a)).
329. i& (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(b)).
330. Lawrence 0. Gostin & Allan M. Brant, Criteria for Evaluating a Ban on the
Advertisement of Cigarettes: Balancing Public Health Benefits With Constitutional Burdens,
269 JAMA 904 (1993).
331. Id. at 906.
332. Susan Cohen, Smooth Sell, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1994, (Magazine) at 8; Maria
Mallory, That's One Angry Camel, Bus. WK., Mar. 7, 1994, at 94.
333. Swecker, supra note 40, at 1555 (footnote ommitted).
334. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,336.
335. Id.
336. Id. Almost one half of all adolescent smokers, and one quarter of nonsmokers,
owned at least one of these items. Id. (citing THE GEORGE H. GALLUP INT'L INSTIT.,
TEEN-AGE ATrITUDES AND BEHAVIOR CONCERNING TOBACCO: REPORT OF THE
FINDINGS 17, 59 (Sept. 1992)).
337. 1d at 41,336-38.
338. Id. at 41,337.
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four studies which, taken together, indicate that such sponsorship "can
lead young people to associate brand names with certain life styles or
activities or can affect their purchasing decisions."339  Given evi-
dence of the power of the media to influence viewers it is difficult to
suggest that removing cigarette sponsorship would not reverse these
affects. However, as discussed below, it remains to be seen whether
this result is significant enough to justify the considerable imposition
on First Amendment commercial speech rights.
d. no more extensive than necessary
i. standard of review: reasonableness vs. proportionality
Cigarette manufacturers find their strongest argument in the
fourth prong of Central Hudson which posits, "if the governmental
interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on
commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive."34 As
originally formulated, this prong is notable for its imprecision.
Subsequent litigation of this prong has demonstrated that this
standard of review may range anywhere from a "least restrictive
means" test to a significantly more deferential and no more precise
"reasonable fit" standard.34' The FDA reads the post-Central
Hudson case law as requiring the lesser standard, and accordingly, the
FDA proposal concludes that "the proposed rule meets the fourth
prong of the Central Hudson test [as]... modified to require that the
governmental regulation of commercial speech not be overbroad.""34
However, the FDA's interpretation of the case law is debatable and
does not take into account the Court's recent restrictive interpretation
of this prong in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.343
The Court's Posadas ruling set the original deferential interpreta-
tion of this prong.' Justice Rehnquist announced, "it [is] clear
339. Id. at 41,337-38 (emphasis added) (citing P.P. Aitken et al., Children's Awareness
of Cigarette Brand Sponsorship of Sports and Games in the UK, 1 HEALTH EDUC. RES.,
THEORY AND PRAc. 203-11 (1986); F. Ledworth, Does Tobacco Sports Sponsorship on
Television Act as Advertising to Children, 43 HEALTH EDUc. J. (1984); Memorandum from
N. Gray, Anti-Cancer Council of Victoria, to All Members of the Federal Parliament (Dec.
15, 1989); J. Hoek et al., Some Effects of Tobacco Sponsorship Advertisements on Young
Males, 12 INT'L J. OF ADVERTISING (Jan. 1993).
340. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
341. See infra notes 344-46 and accompanying text.
342. 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,355.
343. See infra notes 371-76 and accompanying text.
344. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
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beyond peradventure that the challenged statute and regulations
satisfy the fourth ... step of the Central Hudson analysis,, 341 and
therefore the narrowed regulation is "no more extensive than
necessary to serve the government's interest.' '346 'Accordingly, he
rejected Posadas's contention that the First Amendment requires the
Puerto Rican legislature to reduce demand by promulgating speech
to discourage gambling or by directly addressing the underlying
problems rather than by suppressing commercial speech 47
In his dissent Justice Brennan challenged the majority's conclu-
sion that the ban was no more extensive than necessary?48  He
suggested a number of ways in which Puerto Rico could directly ad-
dress the specific harms thought to be "associate[d] with casino
gambling,... avoiding the First Amendment problems raised where
the government seeks to ban constitutionally protected speech.,
349
In Board of Trustees v. Fox 350 the Court claimed to focus on the
scope of this prong for the first time outside of dicta.31' Writing for
the majority, Justice Scalia concluded that the standard is "something
short of a least-restrictive-means standard."35  Scalia's position
stemmed from the need to establish a standard lower than that
accorded pure speech 3  In suggesting that the fit between means
and ends need not be perfect but rather "reasonable," Scalia defines
this standard by indicating that the "scope is 'in proportion to the
interest served"' and "far different ... from the 'rational basis'
test.,
35
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun criticized the rejection of the
least-restrictive-means analysis, noting that the Court reached the
345. Id. at 343.
346. Id.
347. Id- at 344.
348. Id. at 348 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
349. Id. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
350. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
351. 1& at 477.
352. I&
353. Id. at 478. Scalia's choice of words is interesting. He writes, "we think it would
be incompatible with the asserted'subordinate position of commercial speech....' to apply
a more rigid standard in the present context." Id. (alteration in original) (footnote
omitted) (emphasis added). Does he mean to suggest that commercial speech should not
take a subordinate position?
354. IM. at 480 (quoting In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
355. Id (distinguishing the standard of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
analysis articulated in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10
(1949)).
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holding "only by recasting a good bit of contrary language in... past
cases."
356
While the Court in Edenfield v. Fane357 adopted the "reason-
able proportion to the interest served, 358 test, two months later in
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,359 the Court focused instead
on the "reasonable fit" language articulated in Fox."W This deferen-
tial language was necessary to uphold the challenged regulation in
light of evidence of its marginal impact on the asserted substantial
interest.3 61 This switch suggests a willingness to adjust the standard
of review to fit the government's underlying goals, which does not
bode well for the cigarette industry.
Nonetheless, the Edge Broadcasting Court stopped short of
complete deference, recognizing the argument that the government
should first legislate against the harmful act before restricting
commercial speech regarding the act. The Court concluded that "the
Government [need not] make progress on every front before it can
make progress on any front.""36
In his dissent, Justice Stevens also analyzed the case under the
language in Fox, but focused instead on the "in proportion to the
interest served" standard." Applying this test, Stevens concluded
that the "selective ban on... advertising unquestionably flunks that
test; for the means chosen by the Government, a ban on speech
imposed for the purpose of manipulating public behavior, is in no way
proportionate to the.., asserted interest."3 "
ii. proportionality applied to the FDA proposals
While a proportionality test would seem to offer additional
precision in determining whether there is a reasonable fit between a
restriction and the asserted interest, the Court offers little guidance
356. 1& at 486 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
357. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
358. Id. at 1798.
359. 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
360. Id at 2705.
361. Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 956 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1992), affd, 113
S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
362. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2707.
363. Id. at 2708 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 480) (internal quotes
omitted).
364. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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in its application. Under the FDA proposals, there is room to argue
that at least some of the provisions fail for lack of proportionality.
The proposed black-and-white, text-only restriction on print ads
in publications with significant minor readerships3" is by far the
most carefully tailored of the provisions. The proposal sets out clear
standards exempting the restriction from publications "(1) [w]hose
readers aged 18 years or older constitute 85 percent or more of the
total readership, and (2) [t]hat is read by fewer than 2 million persons
under age 18.2" However, it is not clear why these precise figures
should demarcate publications primarily read by adults, though
ultimately a court is likely to defer to the legislature's conclusion.
The complete prohibition on nontobacco items,367 by contrast,
offers no attempt at proportionality. Certainly, there are many ways
to reduce the distribution of these products to minors and therefore
reduce their impact as walking billboards in schools. For example,
product promotions could be limited to proof-of-purchase programs
placing the burden on retailers to completely restrict sales to minors
consistent with the current law. Since such programs would encour-
age sales to the detriment of legal smokers, an alternative solution
would require strict proof of age to obtain the nontobacco product.
This formality could be accomplished, for mail-in promotions, by
requiring a photocopy of a driver's license, or by limiting the
promotions to over-the-counter transactions where the retailer can
check the identification more carefully. Each of these proposals
suggest that this section could be more narrowly tailored while serving
the government interest in reducing the effectiveness of such
promotions to minors.
The FDA proposal to restrict event and entry sponsorship is less
susceptible to narrowing, though its proportionality may be ques-
tioned. The FDA cites a study measuring the viewership of 354
motorsport events broadcast in 1992.26 Children or adolescents
comprised less than seven percent of the total viewing audience of 915
million.369 Furthermore, the chairman of R.J.Reynolds Tobacco
Company cites one study indicating that "97 percent of attendees at
365. 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,374 (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.32(a)).
366. I. (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.32(a)(1)-(2)).
367. Md at 41,374-75 (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.34(a)-(b)).
368. J. Slade, Tobacco Product Advertising During Motorsport Broadcasts: A
Qualitative Assessment, Presentation at the Ninth World Conference on Tobacco and
Health (Oct. 10-14, 1995).
369. Id.
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Winston Cup events are 18 years of age and older.""37 Certainly,
the sheer number of underage viewers cannot be ignored. However,
the eighty-five percent adult readership cutoff, sufficient to exempt
print publications from the lesser penalty of text-only ads is at odds
with the more draconian prohibition of sponsorship for events
carrying a ninety-three percent adult viewership.
These statistics demonstrate the difficulty in determining
proportionality in an area where the comparison is not even apples to
oranges but rather apples to assault weapons. It is tempting to
suggest that the dangers inherent in smoking justify any prohibition
on advertising. But these dangers also justify a complete ban on
tobacco products. Arguably, a complete ban or the gradual reduction
of nicotine, if either were practical, would accomplish results far more
in proportion to their regulations than the marginal impact of the
FDA proposals.
iii. impact of the availability of alternatives to the regulation of
speech
In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,37 the Court rested its opinion
on the government's failure to show that the regulation directly
advanced the asserted government interest.3 2 However, the Court
went on to suggest that the regulation also would not survive First
Amendment scrutiny because it was "not sufficiently tailored to its
goal."373 Coors suggested several alternatives to the label ban and
the Court agreed that "the availability of these options, all of which
could advance the Government's asserted interest in a manner less
intrusive to ... First Amendment rights, indicate[d] that [the
regulation] is more extensive than necessary."374
Despite the FDA's dismissal of Rubin based on a wholly
incorrect interpretation of the holding, 75 the case is particularly
370. Andrew Crask, Tobacco Sponsorships Under Threat, RACER, Oct. 1995, at 8.
371. 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).
372. Id. at 1593. While the materiality test traditionally falls under the "directly
advances" prong of Central Hudson, it can be argued that it is more properly a measure
of the fit of the regulation under the final prong.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 1593-94.
375. The FDA states "nothing in [Rubin] is to the contrary" and parenthetically
suggests that the regulation in Rubin "failed completely to advance the government
interest." 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,355. In fact, -the Court found that the regulation served a
legitimate government interest, but that the overall scheme was irrational, given the
disparity of rules applied to other types of alcohol and in other forms of advertising, which
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relevant in the context of the cigarette advertising debate. Certainly,
there are many ways that the government can reduce the demand for
cigarettes. For example, the government could use counterspeech, or
gradually reduce the level of addictive nicotine.76  Furthermore,
such methods would not infringe on a constitutional right.
v. counter speech as an alternative to regulation
In his concurrence in Virginia State Board,377 Justice Stewart
suggested that the only way ideas should be suppressed is through
"'the competition of other ideas."' 3 78  Where the government
regulates commercial speech, it implies a fear of the profound impact
of the media and suggests that the public is unable to perceive its own
best interests. The Virginia State Board majority noted that "[i]t is
precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing
information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that
the First Amendment makes for US. '3 7 9 The Court also stated that
the First Amendment presupposes that "people will perceive their
own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and ... the
best means to that end is to open the channels of communication
rather than to close them.,
3 80
In his dissent in Central Hudson, Justice Rehnquist, however, sug-
gested that this "marketplace of ideas" metaphor is misplaced in the
context of commercial speech.38' Rehnquist placed great weight on
the free flow of ideas in the political context "not because it will lead
to the discovery of any objective 'truth,' but because it is essential to
our system of sef-government. ' ,3'  However, he advanced this
proposition without suggesting how the free flow of information
benefits self-government outside of its function as a battlefield for
truth.
Rehnquist also expressed cynicism regarding market imperfec-
tions within the marketplace of ideas,31 citing as an example Gertz
undermine the challenged regulation. Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1592-93.
376. See findings contained in H.R. 1853, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995).
377. 425 U.S. 748, 775 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
378. Id at 780 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 339-40 (1974)).
379. Id at 770.
380. Id
381. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 597 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
382. Id at 598 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
383. Id at 592-93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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v. Robert Welch, Inc.,38 wherein the Court noted that "an op-
portunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo harm of defamatory
falsehood."3" Clearly, however, defamation can be distinguished
from truthful commercial speech regarding a lawful practice, as
counterspeech has been shown to be effective in the latter context.
Further on in his dissenting opinion, Rehnquist suggested that the
"notion that more speech is the remedy to expose falsehood [in
commercial speech].., is wholly out of place... [because] if applied
logically the remedy of one who was defrauded would be merely a
statement, available upon request, reciting the Latin maxim 'caveat
emptor.' ,38 6 Such a conclusion is clearly arguable as the additional
speech generally comes from those with a financial or social interest
in exposing the fraud in order to drive the purveyor from the market.
In the context of cigarette advertising, the effectiveness of counter-
speech has already been evidenced by the profound impact of the
antismoking advertisements broadcast following the result in Banzhaf.
In Posadas the Court articulated a far more compelling reason
why counterspeech is not always a sufficient alternative to restriction
of commercial speech. The Court suggested that the public may still
be encouraged by advertisements despite the known dangers.'u
However, this interpretation underestimates the power of counter-
speech which may co-opt the techniques of the product advertisement
or directly expose their manipulation.
In his dissent in Posadas,38 Justice Brennan placed the burden
of proving that counterspeech would be insufficient to protect the
government's interest on the government,389 thereby placing greater
faith in the public to perceive their own best interest when presented
with conflicting arguments.3
384. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
385. Ld. at 344 n.9.
386. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 598 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
387. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 344 (citing Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 751 (5th
Cir. 1983)(en banc), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984)). The Dunagin Court stated:
We do not believe that a less restrictive time, place and manner restriction, such
as a disclaimer warning of the dangers of alcohol, would be effective. The state's
concern is not that the public is unaware of the dangers of alcohol.... The
concern instead is that advertising will unduly promote alcohol consumption
despite known dangers.
Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 751.
388. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 348-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
389. Id at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
390. Id. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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vi. antismoking counterspeech and the proposed educational
programs under the FDA
In 1994 the Surgeon General's report suggested that "a nation-
wide, well[-]funded antismoking campaign could effectively counter
the effects of cigarette advertising in its currently permitted media
forms." '391 Coming from a leading critic of cigarette smoking, this
represents significant confidence in the power of counterspeech.
Antismoking counterspeech has already proved effective in
California32 and Massachusetts393 where antismoking advertise-
ments are one element of comprehensive smoking control programs.
In fact, the Clinton Administration is studying the Massachusetts
tobacco control program which is funded by thirty-six million dollars
in state tobacco taxes.394 Each year, Massachusetts spends fourteen
million dollars directly on antismoking ads, and since 1994, cigarette
sales to teens in the state have dropped forty percent.395
Grassroots antismoking campaigns have also shown some
promise. As an example, "African-American groups have focused
attention on the way certain ads and cigarette brands are aimed
specifically at blacks and have enlisted churches, parents, and school
groups to combat underage smoking., 396  Apparently such efforts
391. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING TOBACCO USE
AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 188 (Feb. 24, 1994)
(Executive Summary).
392. 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,327 (citing T.W. Hu et al., The State Antismoking Campaign and
the Industry Response" The Effects of Advertising on Cigarette Consumption in California,
AEA PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS, May 1995, at 89). The California program was found to
influence 200,000 Californians when they chose to quit smoking between 1990 and 1991.
W. James Popham et al., Do Anti-Smoking Media Campaigns Help Smokers Quit?, 108
PUB. HEALTH REP. 510, 510-13 (1993). A subsequent report indicated that the media
campaign resulted in high levels of awareness among minors and may have contributed to
halting the rise of teen smoking in California. 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,329 (citing W. James
Popham et al., Effectiveness of the California 1990-1991 Tobacco Education Media
Campaign, AM. J. PREY. MED. (1994)).
393. Bob Hohler, U.S. Examines State's Youth Tobacco Effort, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
8, 1995, at 3. In addition to antismoking advertisements, the Massachusetts government
has attempted to counter marketing programs such as "Marlboro Miles" in which smokers
are encouraged to save labels to be exchanged for merchandise carrying the company's
trademark. Id. In April 1995, the state enlisted 200 retailers, including McDonald's, to
give discounts to teens in exchange for a smoke-free pledge. Gleick, supra note 6, at 33-
34.
394. Hohler, supra note 393, at 3.
395. Gleick, supra note 6, at 34.
396. Id. at 33.
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have been effective. In 1993, "only 4.4% of black teens smoke[d],
compared with nearly 23% of white teens. '3w
While it is tempting to suggest that a total ban on advertising
would render such antismoking advertising unnecessary, such a
position ignores the powerful social factors encouraging adolescents
to smoke, and the need to counteract the addictive force of nicotine.
In fact, the FDA itself mandates a manufacturer-financed national
education program, which includes a national antismoking broadcast
campaign along with the proposed restrictions on advertising.398
The FDA based its proposal, in part, on the success of the
antismoking campaigns following the Banzhaf decision. 399 The FDA
was encouraged by the substantial impact of the campaign in the face
of broadcast pro-smoking advertising, suggesting that the antismoking
campaigns may be sufficient to counteract the effect of the current
level of advertising.
vii. the gradual reduction in nicotine levels as an alternative to
regulation of speech
Short of an outright ban on cigarettes, the most effective
regulation contributing towards the reduction of smoking would be
the elimination of the addictive ingredient of nicotine. With this in
mind, Congressman Meehan recently introduced a bill to reduce, and
eventually eliminate, nicotine in tobacco products.4" The bill
contemplates the gradual reduction of nicotine from 10 mg in 1997 to
.05 mg by 2002.01
Such a reduction and elimination could potentially dismantle the
entire cigarette market without the social and political backlash that
would accompany a direct prohibition of cigarettes.' Clearly, such
an option is anathema to cigarette manufacturers who attempt to
downplay the significance of nicotine in smoker's behavior, and insist
397. Id.
398. 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,374 (proposed 21 C.F.R. § 897.29).
399. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,326-27.
400. H.R. 1853, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
401. Id.
402. It is likely that a total ban on smoking would only create a high-profit black
market with the attendant problems of violence and intimidation found within the current
distribution of illegal drugs. Furthermore, the country's attempt at liquor prohibition and
the current drug culture suggests that the criminalization of substances creates social
demand.
FDA RESTRICTIONS ON CIGARETTE ADS
that "'[n]icotine ... is an important component of the taste and
flavor of cigarettes. ""
However, the elimination of nicotine is not without pitfalls. In
making the choice to forgo directly regulating nicotine as a drug
and cigarettes as drug delivery devices, the FDA weighed the public
health cost of a sudden and total withdrawal of cigarettes from the
market.4 5  The agency concluded that the "current health care
system and available pharmaceuticals may not be able to provide
adequate or sufficiently safe treatment for such a precipitous
withdrawal" of fifty million smokers. Furthermore, the black
market would step in to supply addicted users with cigarettes which
may be more dangerous, containing more nicotine, tar, or other
carcinogens.4w
The FDA proposal does not contemplate a gradual reduction in
nicotine. A plan such as that introduced in the House of Representa-
tives may reduce or prevent the dangers articulated by the FDA and
allow tobacco companies time to further diversify and shift their
resources and labor force into the production of safer products.
Clearly, the combination of education programs and the gradual
reduction of nicotine offers a viable and potent alternative to the
further reduction in cigarette advertising. The addictive qualities of
cigarettes would be eliminated and the promotion of the legal product
could compete in the marketplace of ideas. If smokers choose to
continue smoking it will then be based on a true choice.
VII. CONCLUSION
When John Banzhaf petitioned the FCC to declare that the
fairness doctrine applied to cigarette advertising as an issue of public
importance, the Columbia Law student' set in motion a series of
judicial and legislative events worthy of a novel. Over the ensuing
years, cigarette manufacturers have carefully fought mounting
403. Lawmaker Charges Philip Morris Tracked Children, Students as Potential Smokers,
L.A. TIMES, July 25, 1995, at D3.
404. If the FDA were to regulate cigarettes as a drug, the product must be shown to
be safe and effective to prevent their removal from the market. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g),
331(d), 355(a) (1994).
405, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,348.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 41,349.
408. Gerald J. Thain, Prohibitions on Advertising for Products It is Legal to SelL" A
Constitutionally Valid Option, J. PROD. L., SeptJDec. 1984, at 83, 91.
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scientific evidence and social condemnation, empowered primarily by
the addictive quality of their product. The FDA's proposed restric-
tions on advertising will undoubtedly have an impact on a minor's
decision whether to take up the habit. However, the proposal does
not provide help to the fifty million smokers currently addicted to the
nicotine in cigarettes. Rather than directly address the underlying evil
of nicotine, the FDA instead seeks to sacrifice the First Amendment
protection of commercial speech in an unnecessary tradeoff.
Given the profound dangers inherent in the use of tobacco and
the intermediate level of protection afforded commercial speech under
the Central Hudson test and its progeny, tobacco manufacturers face
a daunting task in challenging these further restrictions. As this
Comment demonstrates, the tobacco industry will find its strongest
argument by challenging the tailoring of the law to the government's
interest in protecting underage smokers and nonsmokers.
Undoubtedly the current proposal is merely a stop on the way to
a complete ban on tobacco advertising.' In the near future,
nicotine is likely to remain unregulated and cigarettes will continue
to claim the lives of smokers. In this light, the demise of cigarette
brand sponsorship of auto racing is an exceedingly minor loss.
Modem auto racing was born, in part, upon the banishment of
cigarette advertisements from the broadcast media. With package
product brands poised to fill the void caused by the proposal, the
racing industry will not die with the proposed restrictions, nor will
commercial speech. However, the same cannot be said for current
smokers.
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409. Cf. Canada to Seek Total Ban on Tobacco Ads, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1995, at D1.
In September 1995, the Canadian Supreme Court, in a surprise decision, struck down a
partial ban on tobacco advertising as violative of the right to freedom of speech.
Nonetheless, Canada's health minister announced that the government will seek to ban all
tobacco advertising. Ld.
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